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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, THE LAW–MACHINE
INTERFACE, AND FAIR USE AUTOMATION
Peter K. Yu*
INTRODUCTION
The past decade has seen artificial intelligence (AI) advancing in leaps and
bounds, capturing the attention of not only computer experts and academic
commentators but also policymakers,1 the mass media, and the public at large.2
In the early 2010s, IBM Watson successfully defeated two noted human
champions in the quiz show Jeopardy!3 A few years later, Google DeepMind
created a “Sputnik moment” in Asia4 when it beat the world’s best players in
Go, an Asian strategy board game.5 In addition, recent research has shown the
fast-growing improvements in the performance of artificial intelligence in poker
games.6 Compared with quiz shows and chess games, these games have been
* Copyright © 2020 Peter K. Yu. Professor of Law, Professor of Communication, and Director, Center
for Law and Intellectual Property, Texas A&M University. This Article draws on insights gleaned from the
Inaugural HKU Technology Law Symposium organized by the Law and Technology Centre in the Faculty
of Law at the University of Hong Kong, the International Law Weekend 2019 at Fordham University School
of Law, the Third Annual IP Leaders Roundtable at UIC John Marshall Law School, the FIU Law Review
Symposium and a presentation for the Intellectual Property Law Society at Florida International University
College of Law, the Third Annual Scholarship Retreat at Texas A&M University School of Law, the 17th
Annual Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium at Santa Clara University School of Law, and a
faculty speaker workshop at the University of Kansas School of Law. The discussion of fair use automation
is adapted or expanded from the remarks delivered at the FIU Law Review Symposium, which was recently
published by the FIU Law Review. The Author is grateful to Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Daryl Lim, William
Magnuson, Milan Markovic, and the participants of these events for their valuable comments and suggestions.
1. For example, the Obama Administration has released a number of documents in the artificial
intelligence area, including a strategic plan and a white paper. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATION, AND THE ECONOMY (2016); NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PREPARING
FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2016) [hereinafter PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE]; NAT’L
SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGIC PLAN (2016).
2. In March 2018, The Daily Show featured a segment on robots disrupting the legal system. Ronny
Chieng, Disrupting the Legal System with Robots, THE DAILY SHOW WITH TREVOR NOAH (Mar. 7, 2018),
http://www.cc.com/shows/the-daily-show-with-trevor-noah/cast/ronny-chieng/b27lei/disrupting-thelegal-system-with-robots.
3. John Markoff, Computer Wins on “Jeopardy!”: Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, at A1.
4. See LEE KAI-FU, AI SUPERPOWERS: CHINA, SILICON VALLEY, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 3
(2018) (noting that AlphaGo’s victories “turned into China’s ‘Sputnik Moment’ for artificial intelligence”);
Paul Mozur, In Win for A.I., Google Program Humbles Master of a Mind-Boggling Game, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2017,
at B3 (describing AlphaGo as “a sort of Sputnik moment” for China).
5. See Choe Sang-Hun & John Markoff, Machine Masters Man in Complex Game of Go, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 2016, at A1 (reporting AlphaGo’s victory over eighteen-time world Go champion Lee Sedol); Mozur,
supra note 4 (reporting AlphaGo’s victory over Ke Jie, the world’s then best Go player).
6. See Woodrow Barfield, Towards a Law of Artificial Intelligence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 2, 9 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018) [hereinafter RESEARCH
HANDBOOK] (“[A]n artificially intelligent computer designed by computer scientists beat experts in the game
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particularly difficult because the poker players’ ability to bluff has created an
incomplete information environment. 7
Given these amazing technological developments, it is no surprise that legal
commentators are now actively exploring how artificial intelligence will impact
the law.8 For instance, Eugene Volokh invited us to join him for a highly
provocative thought experiment concerning whether society will be ready to
accept robot judges.9 Mireille Hildebrandt questioned whether the rapid
development of artificial intelligence and smart technologies would undermine
or reconfigure the ends of law in a constitutional democracy. 10 Tim Wu
discussed whether artificial intelligence would “eat” the law and what the
impending “rise of hybrid social-ordering systems” would mean for society.11
Roger Brownsword called for greater attention to the interplay of technology
management and legal rules and to its impact on the traditional rules of law.12

of poker which required the ability to bluff and to predict whether the opponent was bluffing based on
incomplete knowledge of the advisory’s hand.”); Carnegie Mellon University, AI Beats Professionals in Six-Player
Poker, SCIENCEDAILY (July 11, 2019), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/07/190711141343.htm
(“An artificial intelligence program developed by Carnegie Mellon University in collaboration with Facebook
AI has defeated leading professionals in six-player no-limit Texas hold’em poker, the world’s most popular
form of poker.”).
7. As a Carnegie Mellon University press release stated:
Games such as chess and Go have long served as milestones for AI research. In those games, all
of the players know the status of the playing board and all of the pieces. But poker is a bigger
challenge because it is an incomplete information game; players can’t be certain which cards are
in play and opponents can and will bluff. That makes it both a tougher AI challenge and more
relevant to many real-world problems involving multiple parties and missing information.
Carnegie Mellon University, supra note 6.
8. For discussions in this area, see generally Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot:
Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147 (2017); Rebecca Crootof, “Cyborg
Justice” and the Risk of Technological–Legal Lock-In, 119 C OLUM. L. REV. F. 233 (2019); Milan Markovic, Rise of
the Robot Lawyers?, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 325 (2019); John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption:
How Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
3041 (2014); Andrew C. Michaels, Artificial Intelligence, Legal Change, and Separation of Powers, 88 U. CIN. L. REV.
1083 (2020); Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1 (2019) [hereinafter Pasquale, A Rule of Persons]; Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Four Futures of Legal
Automation, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 26 (2015); Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing
Artificially Intelligent Justice, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 242 (2019); Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be
Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501 (2017); Harry Surden, Machine
Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87 (2014); Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135 (2019);
Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat the Law? The Rise of Hybrid Social-Ordering Systems, 119 C OLUM. L. REV.
2001 (2019).
9. Volokh, supra note 8; see also LEE, supra note 4, at 115 (noting the “Shanghai-based pilot program
that uses data from past cases to advise judges on both evidence and sentencing”); Eric Niiler, Can AI Be a
Fair Judge in Court? Estonia Thinks So, WIRED (Mar. 25, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/canai-be-fair-judge-court-estonia-thinks-so (discussing the effort in Estonia “to design a ‘robot judge’ that could
adjudicate small claims disputes of less than €7,000 (about $8,000)”).
10. MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF LAW (2015).
11. Wu, supra note 8, at 2001.
12. As he observed:
To the extent that technological management coexists with legal rules, while some rules will be
redirected, others will need to be refined and revised. Accordingly, . . . the destiny of legal rules is
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Although all of these works carefully reminded us that we are still quite far away
from the scenario in which machine-made decisions can provide realistic
substitutes to human decisions, it is never too early to think more deeply about
the complex questions arising at the intersection of artificial intelligence and the
law.
One area that has not received sufficient policy and scholarly attention13
concerns the law–machine interface in a hybrid environment in which both
humans and intelligent machines will make legal decisions at the same time.14
Because “human-machine hybrids will [likely] be the first replacement for
human-only legal systems,”15 developing a deeper understanding of this
interface is badly needed. Such an understanding will also be important as
artificial intelligence technologies continue to improve and as society becomes
more comfortable in letting machines take over some decisions that have been
traditionally reserved for humans.16 Indeed, society will be better off if it can
achieve an optimal allocation of decision-making power between humans and
machines in such a hybrid environment. Such allocation will foster what
commentators have referred to as the “new division of labor.” 17
to be found somewhere in the range of redundancy, replacement, redirection, revision and
refinement.
ROGER BROWNSWORD, LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: RE-IMAGINING THE REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENT 181 (2019).
13. Commentators have started looking into issues in this area. See generally Crootof, supra note 8
(discussing the benefits and side effects of hybrid human–AI judicial systems, or “cyborg justice”); Pasquale,
A Rule of Persons, supra note 8 (explaining why complementary legal automation will play a bigger role in the
legal profession than substitutive legal automation); Wu, supra note 8 (describing the development of hybrid
machine–human systems as the “predictable future of legal adjudication” and exploring the prospects and
limitations of such development).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 150–154.
15. Wu, supra note 8, at 2002; see also Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, A Common Law for the Age of Artificial
Intelligence: Incremental Adjudication, Institutions, and Relational Non-Arbitrariness, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1775
(2019) (“[T]he coevolution of human and artificial intelligence—what we could call our dance with
machines—is well on its way to becoming routine.”).
16. As Jason Millar and the late Ian Kerr observed:
[W]e will rely on robots without really knowing why—simply because their algorithms provide
the greatest number of successful outcomes. We have already seen this in Google’s search
approach. Neither Larry [Page] nor Sergey [Brin] (nor any other Google employee) knows exactly
why one particular web page is a better result than another. When the click patterns say it is, that’s
good enough. No semantic or causal analysis is required. . . . Like the ancients, we will, quite
rationally, come to rely upon them, knowing full well that we cannot necessarily explain the
reasons for their decisions.
Jason Millar & Ian Kerr, Delegation, Relinquishment and Responsibility: The Prospect of Expert Robots, in ROBOT LAW
102, 106–07 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016); see also WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL M ACHINES:
TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT FROM WRONG 40 (2009) (“As people come to trust the advice of a [decision
support tool], it can become more difficult to question that advice. There is a danger . . . that [decision
support tools] could eventually come to control the decision-making process.”); Anthony J. Casey & Anthony
Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 429, 435 (2016) [hereinafter Casey & Niblett, Self-Driving Laws]
(“[A]s more information is generated, and the evolutionary algorithm updates and becomes a better
forecaster, we imagine that judges will increasingly rely on the advice of the algorithm.”).
17. FRANK LEVY & RICHARD MURNANE, THE NEW DIVISION OF LABOR: HOW COMPUTERS ARE
CREATING THE NEXT JOB MARKET (2012); see also AJAY AGRAWAL ET AL., PREDICTION MACHINES: THE
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In a recently published article commissioned for a symposium on artificial
intelligence and entertainment law, I identified the pros and cons of using
algorithms to automate fair use in U.S. copyright law and called for the
development of an enabling environment to facilitate such automation. 18 In this
Article, I utilize the case study of fair use automation to explore how legal
standards can be automated and what this specific case study can teach us about
the law–machine interface. Although this Article utilizes an example generated
from a specialized area of the law—namely, copyright or intellectual property
law—its insights will apply to other situations involving the interplay of artificial
intelligence and the law. As far as these applicable insights are concerned, one
should be able to substitute the fair use standard with other legal standards,
such as those in criminal, tort, or traffic law.
Part I outlines the case study of fair use automation. This Part begins by
offering a brief overview of the U.S. fair use standard and explaining why the
automation of this standard has been chosen as an illustration. This Part then
closely examines three dominant arguments against greater fair use automation.
Taking seriously the benefits provided by artificial intelligence, machine
learning, and big data analytics, Part II identifies three distinct pathways for
legal automation: (1) the translation pathway, which converts legal mandates or
analytical approaches into computer code and algorithms; (2) the
approximation pathway, which ensures that machine-made decisions closely
resemble human decisions; and (3) the self-determination pathway, which
enables automated systems to make autonomous decisions.
Part III explores the key questions concerning the law–machine interface,
the understanding of which will be important when automated systems are
being designed to implement legal standards. Specifically, these questions focus
on the allocation of decision-making power, the hierarchy of decisions, and the
legal effects of machine-made decisions. Part IV concludes by highlighting the
wide-ranging ramifications of artificial intelligence for the law, the legislature,
the bench, the bar, and academe. Holistic in scope, this Part focuses on lessons
drawn from studying the law–machine interface.
I. FAIR USE AUTOMATION
Although the interplay of artificial intelligence and the law can be analyzed
at an abstract level, it will be more instructive to utilize a concrete example that
readers can closely examine to evaluate the potential and challenges of legal
automation. For coherence and analytical effectiveness, this Article uses the
automation of the U.S. fair use standard as an illustrative example throughout.

SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 53–69 (2018); Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at
282–85.
18. Peter K. Yu, Can Algorithms Promote Fair Use?, 14 FIU L. REV. 329 (2020) [hereinafter Yu, Fair Use].
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Part I.A provides a brief overview of this standard. Part I.B explains why the
automation of this standard has been chosen as an illustration. Part I.C explores
the ongoing resistance toward such automation. This Subpart analyzes the three
dominant arguments questioning the effectiveness and desirability of such
automation and offers responses in turn.
A. The Standard
In the per curiam decision of Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit described fair use as “the most
troublesome in the whole law of copyright.”19 Historically, this standard can be
traced back to the 1841 case of Folsom v. Marsh, a case concerning the
unauthorized reproduction of President George Washington’s writings, official
documents, and private letters that had been extracted from a twelve-volume
book set.20 In that case, Justice Joseph Story drew on the traditional English
doctrine of fair abridgement to develop the common law doctrine of fair use.21
This doctrine was codified a century later when Congress undertook a major
overhaul of the copyright statute in 1976.22 Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright
Act provides as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.23

19. 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
20. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
21. See id. at 345–49. For discussions of the traditional English doctrine of fair abridgement, see
generally Joseph J. Beard, Everything Old Is New Again: Dickens to Digital, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 19, 24–26 (2004);
Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK . L. REV. 1371, 1379–93 (2011).
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (codifying the fair use standard).
23. Id.
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Although this statutory provision enumerates four non-exhaustive factors24
that courts should consider when making fair use determinations, such
determinations are made after the fact.25 Because these determinations require
a case-by-case balancing of multiple factors, the legal outcomes can vary even
for cases involving the same copyrighted work or the same amount of
copying.26
Thus far, commentators have widely disagreed over the expediency of the
fair use standard.27 Its supporters have argued that this standard is clear and
predictable. For instance, Pamela Samuelson observed:
If one analyzes putative fair uses in light of cases previously decided in the
same policy cluster, it is generally possible to predict whether a use is likely to
be fair or unfair. . . . The only clusters of fair use cases in which it is quite
difficult to predict whether uses are likely to be fair is in the educational and
research use clusters where judges have tended to take starkly different
perspectives on fair use defenses in these settings . . . .28

Commentators such as Professor Samuelson and Michael Madison also noted
how the use of clusters could help provide the fair use regime with more clarity
and predictability.29 By contrast, those critical of fair use took the opposite view.
As the Australian Law Reform Commission recounted in its final report on
copyright and the digital economy:

24. See id. (using the phrase “shall include” when referring to the list of fair use factors); id. § 101 (“The
terms ‘including’ and ‘such as’ are illustrative and not limitative.”).
25. See Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 288 (2019) [hereinafter Burk,
Algorithmic Fair Use] (“[F]air use carries with it the disadvantage of ex ante uncertainty; no one can be entirely
certain in advance how a court will weigh the four factors, and hence there is always some apprehension that
a use may be found infringing rather than fair.”); Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for
Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 61 (2001) (“Under the current conception of fair use,
the decision whether or not to use a work is made ex ante by the user—if an infringement suit is brought
later, the court may or may not validate the user’s calculus, but penalties, if any, are imposed after the use has
been undertaken.”); John S. Erickson & Deirdre K. Mulligan, The Technical and Legal Dangers of Code-Based Fair
Use Enforcement, 92 PROC. IEEE 985, 992 (2004) (“In the area of copyright law, the evolution of the doctrine
of ‘fair use’ is tightly bound to the practice of after-the-fact adjudication.”).
26. For example, the fair use analysis of the unauthorized use of a copyrighted song for parody is
significantly different from that of the use of the same song for advertising. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (finding that 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty
Woman” may constitute fair use and remanding the case to the lower court).
27. See generally Australian Law Reform Commission, Copyright and the Digital Economy (Discussion Paper
No 79, May 2013) 74–76 (discussing the criticism that “[f]air use would create uncertainty and expense”);
Peter K. Yu, The Quest for a User-Friendly Copyright Regime in Hong Kong, 32 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 283, 331–34
(2016) [hereinafter Yu, The Quest] (discussing the debate on the fair use standard’s lack of clarity and
precision).
28. Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2542 & n.28 (2009)
[hereinafter Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses].
29. See generally Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1525 (2004) (advancing a pattern-oriented approach to fair use decisions); Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses,
supra note 28 (arguing that a focus on common patterns, or what Professor Samuelson called “policy-relevant
clusters,” will make fair use law more coherent and predictable than many commentators have perceived).
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The opponents of fair use have pointed to research indicating that the
outcome of fair use cases is unpredictable. The outcome of litigation is never
completely predictable—if it were, the parties would not have commenced
litigation, or would likely have settled. This is also true of recent litigation over
the fair dealing exceptions and specific exceptions.30

Although the lack of consensus among copyright experts about the clarity
and predictability of fair use has foreshadowed the challenge society will have
when deploying algorithms and artificial intelligence to automate this legal
standard, the widespread concerns about the standard’s lack of clarity and
predictability also present an immense opportunity—If human decisionmakers
have tremendous difficulty making fair use determinations, will intelligent
machines do a better job? Regardless of whether these machines can perform
better or not, the analysis in this Article will inform research on the interplay of
artificial intelligence and the law. Such analysis will also allow us to better
understand the importance of providing appropriate interfaces between laws
and machines.
B. Why Fair Use?
For a cross-cutting project on legal automation and the law–machine
interface, choosing an illustration that is familiar to a wide range of readers will
be highly important. Other than this Author’s specialized expertise in the
subject area and his past involvement in global copyright reform, 31 the case
study of fair use automation was chosen for five reasons. First, the topic is
familiar to scholars writing in the artificial intelligence area. Many of these
scholars already have some expertise in intellectual property law or cyberlaw.
As a result, this case study can be easily incorporated into their analyses. In
addition, because any analysis in the early days of legal automation is admittedly
preliminary, using an example that is well understood by those writing in the
area will help foster a productive scholarly dialogue in this fast-evolving area of
the law.
Second, the topic is familiar to not only legal scholars but also non-legal
researchers. Whether deciding on the use of a quotation in academic research
or the copying of an excerpt for classroom teaching, academics frequently have

30. Australian Law Reform Commission, Copyright and the Digital Economy (Report No 122, November
2013) 115.
31. For the Author’s earlier works on copyright reforms, see generally Peter K. Yu, The Confuzzling
Rhetoric Against New Copyright Exceptions, in 1 KRITIKA: ESSAYS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 278 (Peter
Drahos et al. eds., 2015); Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18; Peter K. Yu, Can the Canadian UGC Exception Be
Transplanted Abroad?, 26 INTELL. PROP. J. 175 (2014); Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants
in Hong Kong, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693 (2010) [hereinafter Yu, Digital Copyright Reform]; Peter K. Yu, Fair
Use and Its Global Paradigm Evolution, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 111, 129–37 [hereinafter Yu, Global Paradigm
Evolution]; Yu, The Quest, supra note 27. During the last round of digital copyright reform in Hong Kong, the
Author served as a pro bono advisor to Internet user groups and pan-Democrat legislators. Id. at 285.
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to engage with fair use questions, at times with the help of university librarians.
Even if these researchers do not have sufficient copyright expertise, they will
have at least some familiarity with this area of the law. Even better, they will
have experienced both the benefits of fair use and the potential struggle in
drawing precise legal conclusions. Because research in the artificial intelligence
area is highly multi- and inter-disciplinary, picking an illustration that is familiar
to a wide range of scholars, not just those in the legal discipline, will be
conducive to future research.
Third, the longstanding tradition and tremendous complexity of the U.S.
fair use standard will allow readers and researchers to see the benefits,
drawbacks, and challenges of legal automation. Even better, this standard
involves both statutory and case law. While the standard itself has been codified
in Section 107 of the Copyright Act,32 its interpretations have evolved over the
past century in common law.33 Moreover, because fair use determinations are
made on a case-by-case basis by reference to four statutorily stipulated factors,
the study of fair use automation will help illustrate the impact of artificial
intelligence on the operation of rules and standards.34 Understanding this
impact is important, in view of both the prevailing wisdom that automating
rules are easier than standards35 and the recent literature on how legal
automation will greatly reduce the trade-offs between legal rules and
standards.36

32. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
33. The case law on the uncodified fair use doctrine can be traced back to the 1841 case of Folsom v.
Marsh. 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
34. As the Australian Law Reform Commission declared in its final report:
The flexibility of fair use largely comes from the fact that it is a standard, rather than a rule. This
distinction between rules and standards is commonly drawn in legal theory. Rules are more
specific and prescribed. Standards are more flexible and allow decisions to be made at the time
of application, and with respect to a concrete set of facts. Further, ‘standards are often based on
concepts that are readily accessible to non-experts’.
Rules and standards are, however, points on a spectrum. Rules are ‘not infinitely precise, and
standards not infinitely vague’. The legal philosopher H L A Hart wrote that rules have ‘a core of
certainty and a penumbra of doubt’. The distinction is nevertheless useful.
Australian Law Reform Commission, supra note 30, at 98; see also id. at 98–100 (discussing rules and standards
in the fair use context).
35. As Dan Burk observed:
[T]he ex ante indeterminacy of a legal standard such as fair use, which in the institutional operation
of the law constitutes a benefit, presents a challenge for operational machine coding.
Rule-oriented legal imperatives may better lend themselves to automated instructions.
Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 292 (footnote omitted).
36. As Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett observed:
[T]echnological advances in predictive and communication technologies will render th[e]
trade-off between rules and standards unnecessary. A new form of law, the microdirective, will
emerge to provide all of the benefits of both rules and standards without the costs of either. These
microdirectives will provide ex ante behavioral prescriptions finely tailored to every possible
scenario.
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Fourth, although the case study of fair use automation utilizes a legal
standard grounded in U.S. law, this standard has received wide and
ever-growing international support and recognition. 37 At the time of writing,
the U.S. fair use standard has been transplanted abroad—in either identical or
hybrid form—in a number of jurisdictions, including “Israel, Liberia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan.”38 The case
study of fair use automation will therefore allow us to think more deeply about
the global and cross-jurisdictional impact of legal automation.
Finally, fair use automation is not as far-fetched as other proposals or
thought experiments involving legal automation. In the past decade, the
copyright industry and their supportive technology platforms have already
actively deployed automated copyright enforcement to identify, monitor, filter,
and monetize potentially infringing works on digital networks. 39 While
YouTube’s Content ID system provides a paradigmatic example,40 other
platforms have deployed similar tools and algorithms to facilitate such
enforcement.41 To the extent these platforms aim to develop automated
Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1403 (2017); see also
Casey & Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, supra note 16, at 433 (discussing how the development and automatic
updating of micro-directives will move us toward “a world of self-driving laws”).
37. See Yu, Global Paradigm Evolution, supra note 31, at 129–37 (documenting a growing trend toward
the worldwide adoption of the U.S. fair use model and a slowly emerging paradigm evolution of international
copyright norms); see also Peter K. Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, 7 LAWS , no. 1, art. 9, at 3–10 (2018),
http://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/7/1/9 (discussing the efforts to transplant fair use across the world and
the eight different modalities of transplantation that the transplanting jurisdictions have employed). See
generally JONATHAN BAND & JONATHAN GERAFI, THE FAIR USE/FAIR DEALING HANDBOOK (2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2333863 (listing the fair use or fair dealing provisions from around the world).
38. Yu, Global Paradigm Evolution, supra note 31, at 115.
39. For discussions of algorithmic copyright enforcement, see generally Maayan Perel & Niva
Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473 (2016) [hereinafter
Perel & Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement]; Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering:
Beyond Disclosure in Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 189 (2017) [hereinafter Perel & Elkin-Koren,
Black Box Tinkering].
40. See generally How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE HELP, https://support.google.com/youtube/
answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Sept. 13, 2020) (providing an overview of YouTube’s Content ID
system). For discussions of the Content ID system, see generally Perel & Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Copyright
Enforcement, supra note 39, at 509–16; Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 543–60 (2017) [hereinafter Sag, Internet Safe Harbors].
41. As Matthew Sag observed:
[D]espite the lack of a de jure obligation to filter under the DMCA [Digital Millennium Copyright
Act], many platforms—typically large-scale commercial enterprises—are nonetheless
implementing automated copyright enforcement systems. At the present time, platforms using
automated copyright enforcement include Scribid, 4shared, Dropbox, YouTube, Facebook,
SoundCloud, Twitch, TuneCore, Tumblr, Veoh, and Vimeo. The pressure to adopt automated
filtering comes primarily from rightsholders, but these systems also meet some of the business
objectives of platforms.
Sag, Internet Safe Harbors, supra note 40, at 538–39 (footnotes omitted); see also NICOLAS P. SUZOR, L AWLESS :
THE SECRET RULES THAT GOVERN OUR DIGITAL LIVES 72 (2019) (“Automated copyright detection
systems have now been built into many other services on the internet. Facebook has developed its own
detection systems, and companies like Audible Magic produce software that has been adopted by many
platforms.”); Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 284 (“In the area of copyright, protection of digitized
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enforcement systems that are consistent with existing copyright law, it is
expected that some form of fair use has already been built into these systems. 42
Moreover, a growing number of commentators have now called for greater
algorithmic deployment to promote fair use in copyright law.43 To them,
automation is a much-needed solution demanded by the fast pace of digital
dissemination and the exceedingly large volume of distributed content. 44
C. Resistance Toward Automation
At the time of writing, there have been three dominant arguments against
greater fair use automation: (1) the relatively backward state of technology is
unable to support satisfactory fair use automation; (2) the development of
automated fair use systems will change creative choices and practices; and (3)
experts have documented biases, bugs, and other problems in automated
systems and artificial intelligence technologies, both within and outside the
intellectual property area. This Subpart discusses and responds to each
argument in turn in the hope of explaining why greater fair use automation is
both urgently needed and socially beneficial.
works is already increasingly mediated by algorithmic enforcement systems that are intended to effectuate the
rights of copyright owners while simultaneously limiting the liability of content intermediaries.”).
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (requiring “[a] statement that the complaining party has a good faith
belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its
agent, or the law”); Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“A
consideration of the applicability of the fair use doctrine simply is part of that initial review [of the potentially
infringing material prior to sending a takedown notice as required by Section 512(c) of the Copyright Act].”).
43. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 49, 56 (2006) (“[Digital rights management] mechanisms engineered to protect fair use rights are in
the long-term interests of both content providers and consumers.”); Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, 64
UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1085 (2017) (“[T]he checks that [fair use] intends to create on the rights of authors
must . . . be embedded in the design of online systems.”); Sag, Internet Safe Harbors, supra note 40, at 531–32
(“[T]here is no reason in principle why matching algorithms could not be fine-tuned to identify common
situations associated with a higher probability of fair use.”); Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Antianticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 13, 63 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention]
(“The fact that the scope and boundaries of [fair use] are uncertain and that software code at the current state
of technology may not be able to capture the full range of exceptions and limitations in the copyright system
does not mean that we should not build legitimate uses into the [digital rights management] systems.”); Yu,
Fair Use, supra note 18, at 338–50 (building the case for greater algorithmic deployment to promote fair use
in U.S. copyright law); Barbara L. Fox & Brian A. LaMacchia, Encouraging Recognition of Fair Uses in DRM
Systems, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 61, 63 (“[The limitation on developing a perfect mathematical model of
fair use] should not stop us from attempting to identify a useful subset we might approximate in code.”).
44. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1098 (“The need to address the sheer volume of copyright
disputes requires a new approach to fair use that involves rethinking the role of legal oversight in algorithmic
adjudication.”); Sag, Internet Safe Harbors, supra note 40, at 554 (“With over 400 hours of video being uploaded
to YouTube every minute, it is hard to imagine that either rightsholders . . . or the platform itself . . . could
meaningfully prevent the evisceration of online copyright without relying on automation to some extent.”);
see also id. at 513 (“In 2016, YouTube users were uploading 400 hours of video content every minute . . . .”);
Jeff Desjardins, How Much Data Is Generated Each Day?, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/how-much-data-is-generated-each-day-cf4bddf29f (“By 2025,
it’s estimated that 463 exabytes of data will be created each day globally—that’s the equivalent of 212,765,957
DVDs per day!”).
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1. Backward State of Technology
The first dominant argument concerns our relatively backward state of
technology, which commentators believe is inadequate to support satisfactory
fair use automation.45 At the turn of the millennium, when the copyright and
technology industries, policymakers, and legal experts were exploring whether
fair use could be built into digital rights management systems, Edward Felten
warned us bluntly that we did not yet and might never have a “judge on a
chip.”46 As he observed at that time: “Fair use is one of the starkest examples
of the mismatch between what the law requires and what technology can do.
Accurate, technological enforcement of the law of fair use is far beyond today’s
state of the art and may well remain so permanently.” 47 Writing around that
time, Dan Burk and Julie Cohen also observed, “At least for now, there is no
feasible way to build rights management code that approximates both the
individual results of judicial determinations and the overall dynamism of fair
use jurisprudence.”48
While these scholars were right to identify the technological barriers to
developing satisfactory automated fair use systems, it remains debatable
whether incremental steps can be taken to build these systems.49 After all,
45. See Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 331–33 (discussing our relatively backward state of technology as
a major argument against the satisfactory deployment of algorithms to promote fair use).
46. See Edward W. Felten, A Skeptical View of DRM and Fair Use, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 57, 58
(“A [digital rights management] system that gets all fair use judgments right would in effect be a ‘judge on a
chip’ predicting with high accuracy how a real judge would decide a lawsuit challenging a particular use.
Clearly, this is infeasible with today’s technology.”); see also Burk & Cohen, supra note 25, at 59 (“At present,
only human intelligence, reviewing the unique circumstances of a particular use, can determine whether it is
likely to be fair.”).
47. Felten, supra note 46, at 59; see also JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 192 (2019) (“Automated processes have obvious
efficiency advantages, but such processes may not align well (or at all) with applicable legal requirements that
are couched in shades of gray.”); Ian R. Kerr et al., Technical Protection Measures: Tilting at Copyright’s Windmill,
34 OTTAWA L. REV. 7, 31 (2002) (“[T]he technologies employed by [digital rights management systems] are
not yet sufficiently sophisticated to mirror the law of copyright because [technological protection measures]
themselves remain incapable of distinguishing between infringing and non-infringing uses of digital works.”);
Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 110–11 (2007)
(“Image-parsing software may someday be able to identify pictures or videos that are similar to individual
copyrighted works, but they will never be able to determine whether those pictures are fair uses, or whether
they are legitimate copies or displays made under one of the many statutory exceptions . . . .”).
48. Burk & Cohen, supra note 25, at 56.
49. Dan Burk and Julie Cohen expressed concern that the development of automated fair use systems
would encourage minimalist interpretations of important safeguards and the establishment of ceilings for
these safeguards:
We are . . . skeptical . . . about the ability of negotiated [technical] defaults to capture the full range
of social benefit that more flexible legal standards allow. While these defaults sometimes might
allow access that would exceed fair use under a judicial determination, the “safe harbor” concept
is more likely to tend toward a minimalist view of fair use. We suspect that copyright holders
would be willing to concede fair use in only a small fraction of the situations that would constitute
fair use—indeed, it was just such insistence upon minimalist guidelines by rights holders that led
to the collapse of the [Conference on Fair Use] discussions. Moreover, in the case of the 1976
“safe harbor” guidelines for educational copying, rights holders, content users, and even courts
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building technological systems takes time, and there will always be a
less-than-ideal transitional period. As Microsoft software architects Barbara
Fox and Brian LaMacchia declared in the early 2000s:
[The limitation that no one can mathematically model fair use, as it is
understood today,] should not stop us from attempting to identify a useful
subset we might approximate in code. That is, we can take a purely pragmatic
engineering approach . . . : Focus first on defining and modeling a useful
subset of fair use rights in some policy language, then add these expressions
to the policy evaluators of [digital rights management] systems.50

In an article written in the mid-2000s, I also noted the need to distinguish
between limitations and exceptions that can be interpreted by machines from
those that cannot.51 As I explained at that time:
The fact that the scope and boundaries of [fair use] are uncertain and that
software code at the current state of technology may not be able to capture
the full range of exceptions and limitations in the copyright system does not
mean that we should not build legitimate uses into the [digital rights
management] systems.52

have shown a deplorable tendency to act as though the guidelines defined the outer limits of fair
use. To the contrary, such guidelines were intended to delineate fair use minima: a floor rather
than a ceiling. We are consequently reluctant to recommend an infrastructure based solely on the
design of similar defaults into self-enforcing “lock-out” systems for fear that the “ceiling” effect
could be even more pernicious.
Burk & Cohen, supra note 25, at 57 (footnotes omitted); see also Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1096 (“The
main concern is that reducing the four-factor analysis into a simplistic and somewhat rigid set of algorithmic
instructions might cause some important aspects of fair use analysis to get lost along the way.”).
50. Fox & LaMacchia, supra note 43, at 63. Professor Sag concurred:
The difficulty of completely automating fair use analysis does not suggest . . . that algorithms have
no role to play. Experience, common sense, and recent empirical research suggest that there are
some objective characteristics that make a finding of fair use more likely, and there is no reason
in principle why matching algorithms could not be fine-tuned to identify common situations
associated with a higher probability of fair use.
Sag, Internet Safe Harbors, supra note 40, at 531–32. Likewise, Timothy Armstrong observed:
The flaw in the conclusion that [digital rights management] cannot accommodate fair use is an
unduly hasty inductive leap from the specific (the impossibility of modeling the substance of fair
use law in machine-administrable form) to the general (the supposed impossibility of protecting
fair use at all in [digital rights management] systems). The foreclosure of one avenue for protecting
fair use, however, does not imply that all avenues are likewise foreclosed, but only that design
principles other than the creation of a perfect “judge on a chip” must be explored.
Armstrong, supra note 43, at 88.
51. See Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, supra note 43, at 63–73 (discussing the need for
such a distinction); see also Deirdre Mulligan & Aaron Burstein, Implementing Copyright Limitations in Rights
Expression Languages, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: ACM WORKSHOP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS
MANAGEMENT, DRM 2002, WASHINGTON, DC, USA, NOVEMBER 18, 2002: REVISED PAPERS 137 (Joan
Feigenbaum ed., 2002) (discussing ways and challenges to implementing copyright limitations and exceptions
in rights expression languages, with a focus on XrML, the eXtensible Rights Markup Language); Fox &
LaMacchia, supra note 43, at 63 (considering the importance of determining “how to create
machine-interpretable expressions that adequately model a set (or subset) of fair use rights”).
52. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, supra note 43, at 63.
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Moreover, the landscape of copyright enforcement has changed
substantially in the past decade. As noted earlier, the copyright industries and
technology platforms have already widely deployed algorithms to facilitate
copyright enforcement.53 If fair use is not built, or sufficiently built, into these
algorithms—or if we do not develop what Niva Elkin-Koren has coined “fair
use by design”54—the balance in the copyright system will shift too much
toward the interests of copyright holders to the disadvantage of individual
users.55 Fearing the violation of copyright law, many risk-averse users may forgo
their socially productive creative endeavors.56 Those who constantly have to
test the limits of copyright law may also lose respect for the law,57 viewing it
instead as an illegitimate product of industry capture.58
2. Changes in Creative Choices and Practices
The second dominant argument relates to the changes in creative choices
and practices that will be generated by the development of automated fair use
systems.59 In a recent article, Dan Burk expressed fear that algorithmic fair use
would create considerable biases, which in turn would affect authorial choices.60
As he lamented: “[T]he design values embedded in automated systems become
embedded in public behavior and consciousness. Thus, algorithmic fair use
carries with it the very real possibility of habituating new media participants to
its own biases and so progressively altering the fair use standard it attempts to

53. See sources cited supra note 39.
54. Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1100.
55. See id. (“Fair use by design has become a necessity in an era of algorithmic governance. The need
to develop such tools is necessary in order to tilt the copyright balance back to its origin in our robo notice
environment.”); Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 284–85 (“[I]t may seem desirable to incorporate
context-specific fair use metrics into copyright-policing algorithms, both to protect against automated
overdeterrence and to inform users of their compliance with copyright law.”).
56. See Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 288 (“Risk averse content users, unable to confidently
predict the ultimate decision on their activities, may forgo some socially beneficial uses.”); Elkin-Koren, supra
note 43, at 1100 (“The high cost and high risk involved in fair use implementation prevents users from taking
advantage of productive uses that can foster copyright goals, simply because they fear liability.”); Yu, Fair
Use, supra note 18, at 349 (“If automated fair use determinations can have legal effects—even if only on an
interim basis—those determinations can enlarge the creative spaces of risk-averse users, some of whom may
fear that their creative endeavors will violate current copyright law.”).
57. Cf. Armstrong, supra note 43, at 109 (“Empowering users to exercise their fair use rights without
violating the DMCA might . . . increase law-abiding behavior and temper the critical evaluation of the DMCA
as a one-sided giveaway to powerful producer cartels.” (footnote omitted)).
58. See generally MONICA HORTEN, A COPYRIGHT MASQUERADE: HOW CORPORATE LOBBYING
THREATENS ONLINE FREEDOMS (2013) (discussing how legislative capture by the copyright industries has
undermined online freedom); BRINK LINDSEY & STEVEN M. TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY: HOW THE
POWERFUL ENRICH THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN GROWTH, AND INCREASE INEQUALITY 64–89 (2017)
(discussing industry capture in the intellectual property area).
59. See Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 334–35 (discussing the potential changes in creative choices and
practices as a major argument against the satisfactory deployment of algorithms to promote fair use).
60. See Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 285.
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embody.” 61 Because of the inevitable entanglement between algorithms and the
users’ creative practices, the development of automated fair use systems will
cause behavioral changes that will eventually generate new legal norms.62 In
turn, the development of these new norms and practices will degrade the fair
use standard into “an unrecognizable form.”63 Such development will also
initiate “a self-reinforcing cycle” in which “[the] increasing use of AI
adjudication will foster changes in values that are conducive to even greater use
of AI adjudication.”64
Professor Burk was right that the development of automated fair use
systems will likely foster changes in creative choices and practices, and his
observation was well supported by the behavioral changes we have already seen
among those Internet and social media users who manipulated or circumvented
the algorithms deployed by copyright holders and technology platforms. 65
However, behavioral changes are inevitable whenever decisions are made. As I
noted in a recent symposium, “The key question about automated fair use
systems is . . . not whether these systems will make decisions, but whether they
will make worse decisions, or make worse decisions more frequently.”66 If
machine-made decisions are just as good as those made by human
decisionmakers, such as judges or law enforcement personnel, the public will
find machine-made decisions less problematic even if they are to induce
changes in user behavior.
Moreover, there is hitherto insufficient evidence to show whether
automated decisions will help creators more than they will hurt them. For
risk-averse creators, having low-cost fair use determinations in real time will
61. Id.
62. See Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS ON
COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY 167, 183 (Tarleton Gillespie et al. eds., 2014) (discussing
the entanglement between algorithms and social practices).
63. See Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 306 (“[A]ttempting to incorporate fair use into
enforcement algorithms threatens to degrade the exception into an unrecognizable form. Worse yet, social
internalization of a bowdlerized version of fair use deployed in algorithmic format is likely to become the
new legal and social norm.”).
64. Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 247; see also id. at 249–52 (discussing how AI-driven
developments will affect the ways humans interact with and relate to the law and the judiciary).
65. See Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. R EV. 1, 12–14 (2018)
(listing avoidance, altered conduct, altered input, and obfuscation among the dominant gaming strategies
deployed by users on Internet platforms); Caleb Garling, Tricking Facebook’s Algorithm, ATLANTIC (Aug. 8,
2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/tricking-facebooks-algorithm/375801
(discussing the experience of tricking Facebook to elevate the author’s post); Anjana Susarla, The New Digital
Divide Is Between People Who Opt Out of Algorithms and People Who Don’t, CONVERSATION (Apr. 17, 2019, 6:54
AM), https://theconversation.com/the-new-digital-divide-is-between-people-who-opt-out-of-algorithmsand-people-who-dont-114719 (“A study of Facebook usage found that when participants were made aware
of Facebook’s algorithm for curating news feeds, about 83% of participants modified their behavior to try to
take advantage of the algorithm, while around 10% decreased their usage of Facebook.”); Tony Zhou,
Postmortem: Every Frame a Painting, MEDIUM (Dec. 2, 2017), https://medium.com/@tonyszhou/postmortem1b338537fabc, quoted in Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 303 (explaining how the author and his
partner edited around YouTube’s Content ID system by making trial-and-error adjustments).
66. Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 354.
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likely be highly beneficial.67 Because the U.S. fair use system requires courts to
make determinations ex post, those users who do not have sufficient economic
resources to hire copyright lawyers to test the law’s boundaries may choose not
to make socially productive use of copyrighted works in the first place.68 By
providing a helpful safe harbor, greater fair use automation can provide
important benefits to creators—and, by extension, society.
3. Technological Shortcomings
The third dominant argument pertains to the biases, bugs, and other
documented problems now found in automated systems and artificial
intelligence technologies.69 The technological problems in this area are not
limited to fair use automation; they have been widely documented outside the
intellectual property area. For instance, ProPublica published a widely praised
exposé on the racial biases found in COMPAS, the scoring software used by
law enforcement and correction personnel to determine risks of recidivism. 70
As the investigatory report stated, “black defendants were far more likely than
white defendants to be incorrectly judged to be at a higher risk of recidivism,
while white defendants were more likely than black defendants to be incorrectly
flagged as low risk.”71 In addition, the media provided wide coverage of how
Microsoft’s Twitter bot Tay had quickly become sexist and racist because its
“algorithms . . . had [the bot] ‘learning’ how to respond to others based on what
was tweeted at it.”72 Another report stated that Hewlett-Packard’s facial
recognition technology had failed to properly recognize African-Americans

67. See id. (discussing the benefits of automated systems in providing low-cost fair use determinations);
see also Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 289 (“Automated identification and removal, whether
accurate or mistaken, is relatively cheap, whereas legal and institutional engagement is comparatively
expensive.”); Volokh, supra note 8, at 1147 (“Realistically, the only way we are likely to sharply increase access
to expensive services, such as lawyering, is through technology.”).
68. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004) (“[F]air use in America simply means the
right to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create.”).
69. See Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 335–38 (discussing technological shortcomings as a major
argument against the satisfactory deployment of algorithms to promote fair use); see also ANDREW MCAFEE
& ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON, MACHINE, PLATFORM, CROWD: HARNESSING OUR DIGITAL FUTURE 53 (2017)
(noting the “biases and bugs” in intelligent machines); Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 285 (listing
“ersatz objectivity, diminished decisional transparency, and design biases” among the inherent pitfalls in
reliance on algorithmic regulation); Peter K. Yu, The Algorithmic Divide and Equality in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence, 72 FLA. L. REV. 331, 354–61 (2020) [hereinafter Yu, Algorithmic Divide] (discussing algorithmic
discrimination and distortion).
70. Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm. COMPAS stands
for “Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions.” Id.
71. Id.
72. LEE RAINIE & JANNA ANDERSON, CODE-DEPENDENT: PROS AND CONS OF THE ALGORITHM
AGE 2 (2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/02/08/code-dependent-pros-and-cons-of-the-algorithmage.
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because the “[c]ameras on [its] new . . . computers did not track the faces of
Black people in some common lighting conditions.”73
Even worse, commentators have shown that automated systems will
“disproportionately affect groups that are already disadvantaged by factors such
as race, gender and socio-economic background.”74 When learning
algorithms—or so-called “learners”75—are deployed, the harm to these
disadvantaged groups could be even greater, considering that the problematic
algorithmic outcomes will be fed back into the automated systems as training
data. Such repeated use of data will create self-reinforcing feedback loops that
amplify the biases found in the initial algorithms or training data.76 Until these
biases are corrected, the initial biases will be greatly magnified.77
As we build automated fair use systems and make the needed adjustments
to improve them, having problems in the transitional period is inevitable. The
fact that we have problems in the current iterations of the automated systems
does not mean that we should refrain from using these systems in the first place.
It only means that we have to be careful about such usage, be active in
73. Christian Sandvig et al., When the Algorithm Itself Is a Racist: Diagnosing Ethical Harm in the Basic
Components of Software, 10 INT’L J. C OMM. 4972, 4973 (2016) (citations omitted).
74. Kate Crawford & Ryan Calo, There Is a Blind Spot in AI Research, NATURE (Oct. 13, 2016),
https://www.nature.com/news/there-is-a-blind-spot-in-ai-research-1.20805; see also VIRGINIA EUBANKS,
AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 12 (2017)
(lamenting how “[a]utomated decision-making shatters the social safety net, criminalizes the poor, intensifies
discrimination, and compromises our deepest national values”); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH
DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 8 (2016) (noting
that algorithm-driven automated systems “tend to punish the poor . . . because they are engineered to
evaluate large numbers of people”); R AINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 72, at 63–65 (surveying views on
whether the disadvantaged will lag behind even further in this algorithmic age). See generally SAFIYA UMOJA
NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018) (discussing
how search engines promote racism and sexism).
75. See PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE
LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 6 (2015) (“Learning algorithms—also known as
learners—are algorithms that make other algorithms. With machine learning, computers write their own
programs, so we don’t have to.”).
76. As Ronald Yu and Gabriele Spina Alì observed:
[T]here is a strong risk that AI may reiterate and even amplify the biases and flaws in datasets,
even when these are unknown to humans. In this sense, AI has a self-reinforcing nature, due to
the fact that the machine’s outputs will be used as data for future algorithmic operations.
Ronald Yu & Gabriele Spina Alì, What’s Inside the Black Box? AI Challenges for Lawyers and Researchers, 19 LEGAL
INFO. MGMT. 2, 4 (2019) (footnote omitted); see also Sofia Grafanaki, Autonomy Challenges in the Age of Big Data,
27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 803, 827 (2017) (noting that “algorithmic self-reinforcing
loops are now present across many spheres of our daily life (e.g., retail contexts, career contexts, credit
decisions, insurance, Google search results, news feeds)”); Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of
Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 69 (2019) (“Bad data . . . can perpetuate inequalities through
machine learning, leading to a feedback loop that replicates existing forms of bias, potentially impacting
minorities as a result.”); Digital Decisions, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., https://cdt.org/files/2018/09/
Digital-Decisions-Library-Printer-Friendly-as-of-20180927.pdf (“Unreliable or unfair decisions that go
unchallenged can contribute to bad feedback loops, which can make algorithms even more likely to
marginalize vulnerable populations.”).
77. See Yu, Algorithmic Divide, supra note 69, at 359 (“As time passes, the biases generated through these
loops will become much worse than the biases found in the original algorithmic designs or the initial training
data.”).
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undertaking cost-benefit analyses, and be ready to provide updates or
corrections when problems arise.78
For example, in view of the problems found in automated systems and
artificial intelligence technologies, commentators have called for efforts to
make algorithmic designs more transparent by requiring audits79 or regulatory
oversight.80 Such transparency is badly needed considering that the algorithms
involved are often locked in so-called “black box” systems.81 Commentators
have also noted the importance of human intervention.82 Even though
78. See BROWNSWORD, supra note 12, at 297 (calling for “the regulatory framework [to] provide for the
correction of the malfunction” in the technology); Yu, Algorithmic Divide, supra note 69, at 379–80 (calling for
the development of a “notice and correct” mechanism to address problems generated by automated systems).
79. As the Center for Democracy and Technology noted:
Audits are one method to provide explanations and redress without compromising the intellectual
property behind the business model. Designing algorithmic systems that can be easily audited
increases accountability and provides a framework to standardize best practices across industries.
While explanations can help individuals understand algorithmic decision making, audits are
necessary for systemic and long-term detection of unfair outcomes. They also make it possible to
fix problems when they arise.
Digital Decisions, supra note 76; see also Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms
and the Law, 31 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 37–42 (2017) (discussing ways to test and evaluate algorithms); Pauline
T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. P A. L. REV. ONLINE 189 (2017) (discussing the use of
audits as a check against discrimination); Yu, Algorithmic Divide, supra note 69, at 380–82 (discussing the need
for algorithmic audits).
80. See Yu, Algorithmic Divide, supra note 69, at 380 (discussing the need for institutional oversight); see
also INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, ETHICALLY ALIGNED DESIGN: A VISION FOR PRIORITIZING HUMAN
WELL-BEING WITH AUTONOMOUS AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 70 (2017) (“An independent, internationally
coordinated body . . . should be formed to oversee whether [autonomous and intelligent systems] actually
meet ethical criteria, both when . . . deployed, and considering their evolution after deployment and
interaction with other products.”); Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to Automated Authority, 9 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 235, 247 (2011) (“[P]erhaps a trusted advisory committee within the Federal
Trade Commission could help courts and agencies adjudicate coming controversies over search engine
practices.”).
81. See EUBANKS, supra note 74, at 5 (“[T]hat’s the thing about being targeted by an algorithm: you get
a sense of a pattern in the digital noise, an electronic eye turned toward you, but you can’t put your finger on
exactly what’s amiss.”); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 3 (2015) (“[W]orkings [in black box systems] are mysterious; we can
observe [their] inputs and outputs, but we cannot tell how one becomes the other.”); RAINIE & ANDERSON,
supra note 72, at 19 (“There is a larger problem with the increase of algorithm-based outcomes beyond the
risk of error or discrimination—the increasing opacity of decision-making and the growing lack of human
accountability.” (quoting Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center)). For
book-length treatments of the problems generated by “black box” algorithms, see generally EUBANKS, supra
note 74; O’NEIL, supra note 74; PASQUALE, supra.
82. Professors Casey and Niblett, for example, noted the continuous role of humans in algorithmic
development:
Algorithmic decision-making does not mean that humans are shut out of the process. Even after
the objective has been set, there is much human work to be done. Indeed, humans are involved
in all stages of setting up, training, coding, and assessing the merits of the algorithm. If the
objectives of the algorithm and the objective of the law are perfectly aligned at the ex ante stage,
one must ask: Under what circumstances should a human ignore the algorithm’s suggestions and
intervene after the algorithm has made the decision?
Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, A Framework for the New Personalization of Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 333,
354 (2019) [hereinafter Casey & Niblett, A Framework]; see also Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 22(3), 2016
O.J. (L 119) 1, 46 (requiring data controllers to “implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s
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Professors Burk and Cohen were skeptical of the successful development of
automated fair use systems, they advanced a proposal calling for “the
introduction of an external [human] decisionmaker into the process for
obtaining access to technologically secured works.”83 In a proposal advanced
more than a decade ago, I also advocated the “technology first, courts later”
approach to enable courts to step in to provide the needed human
intervention.84
4. Summary
In sum, the development of automated fair use systems is still fraught with
problems. Nevertheless, remedies do exist to address some of these problems.
Moreover, technology will continue to improve. Compared with the turn of this
century when commentators were actively debating whether fair use could be
built into digital rights management systems, the technology and data that have
become available today to build automated fair use systems are already very
different. As Professor Elkin-Koren reminded us:
Overall, th[e] concerns regarding the limitations of algorithmic fair use
overlook recent developments in Artificial Intelligence . . . and machine
learning capabilities. AI has already been applied in very sophisticated
contexts: physicians use algorithms to guide their diagnoses; banks use them
to decide when to approve a loan; security agencies use AI to identify risks;
lawyers use them to perform due diligence; and even courts rely on algorithms
for sentencing, by scoring the risk of the offender committing future crimes.
AI has already been applied for decision-making processes in contexts that are

rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the
controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest [a decision based solely on automated processing,
including profiling]”); Peter K. Yu, Beyond Transparency and Accountability: Three Additional Features Algorithm
Designers Should Build into Intelligent Platforms, 13 NE. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (calling on technology
platforms to build intervenability into algorithmic designs and operations). See generally Aziz Z. Huq, A Right
to a Human Decision, 106 VA. L. REV. 611 (2020) (discussing whether individuals have a “right to a human
decision”); Meg Leta Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop: Political Constructions of Computer Automation and
Personhood, 47 S OC. STUD. SCI. 216 (2017) (tracing the historical roots of “[t]he right to a human in the loop”
back to rights that protect the dignity of data subjects).
83. Burk & Cohen, supra note 25, at 59; see also Armstrong, supra note 43, at 75 (recognizing the need
to include “human involvement” to facilitate the consideration of “a greater level of complexity in the
circumstances”); Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 537, 551 (2005) (“[T]echnological controls tend to be relatively blunt instruments for control of
digital content, unable to accommodate copyright fair use without the re-introduction of human discretion.”).
84. See Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, supra note 43, at 73 (“[A] two-step approach—
technology first, then courts—seems to be the best compromise we can have today, and it is worth
considering developing such a system as we explore the next generation of [digital rights management]
systems.”). Niva Elkin-Koren outlined a similar approach: “Algorithmic fair use could . . . involve a two-tier
review. First, algorithmic screening would be performed and second, for cases which were flagged by the
system, but were inconclusive, human review would be conducted.” Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1098.

8CE27804-BB25-428A-BE50-16224798167C.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/5/2020 9:21 PM

206

[Vol. 72:1:187

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW

far more complex than fair use, involving critical issues of life and death,
health, financial risks, and national security.85

II. PATHWAYS FOR LEGAL AUTOMATION
In addressing the three dominant arguments against fair use automation,
the previous Part has shown the benefits of greater legal automation in this area.
If we are to proceed with such automation, we will need to think about the
different paths that can be taken to automate the fair use standard. Although
many pathways for legal automation exist, three stand out: (1) translation; (2)
approximation; and (3) self-determination. While the first two pathways are
built upon the existence of and reliance on human decisions, the last pathway
allows for autonomous determinations, which can take place regardless of the
existence or volume of human decisions. This Part discusses each pathway in
turn and ties the discussion to the ongoing developments in artificial
intelligence, machine learning, and big data analytics.
A. Translation
The first pathway for automating the fair use standard is translation. The
scholarly engagement with the need to translate legal standards into computer
code and algorithms is nothing new. When the Internet first entered the
mainstream in the mid-1990s, a sizeable literature quickly emerged to discuss
ways to faithfully translate laws in physical space to cyberspace. For instance,
Lawrence Lessig reminded us that “code is law” and that algorithms could be
built to reflect or ignore our constitutional values.86 Focusing on what he coined
“lex informatica,” the late Joel Reidenberg also called on policymakers to pay
greater attention to the development of technology rules and to encourage such
development.87
While the discussion of the need for translation in the artificial intelligence
context is a logical extension of this earlier cyberlaw debate, tremendous
difficulties remain in the efforts to translate legal mandates into computer code
and algorithms.88 As far as legal automation is concerned, the developers of
automated fair use systems have the daunting task of figuring out how to build

85. Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1096–97 (footnotes omitted).
86. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 1 (2006).
87. Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76
TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998).
88. See Perel & Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, supra note 39, at 486 (“Translating
doctrinal law and policy into code may result in significant, albeit unintentional, alterations of meaning, partly
because the artificial languages intelligible to computers have a more limited vocabulary than human
languages.” (footnote omitted)).
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legal rules and outcomes into these systems.89 As Maayan Perel and Niva
Elkin-Koren observed, “[T]ranslating legal mandates into code inevitably
embodies particular choices as to how the law is interpreted, which may be
affected by a variety of extrajudicial considerations, including the conscious and
unconscious professional assumptions of program developers, as well as
various private business incentives.”90 In their earlier work, Dan Burk and Julie
Cohen also expressed skepticism that “system designers will be able to
anticipate the range of access privileges that may be appropriate for fair uses to
be made of a particular work . . . [as well as] the types of uses that would be
considered fair by a court.”91
Even worse, for a legal standard that courts will only interpret ex post, such
as the U.S. fair use standard, computer programmers will have to determine in
advance how the law will affect the outcome—often by making educated
guesses. While adjudicated cases and their related fact patterns can provide
helpful guidance, many situations will be of first impression and will therefore
present substantial translational challenges and complications. A case in point
is an interesting empirical experiment conducted by Lisa Shay, Woodrow
Hartzog, John Nelson, and Gregory Conti.92 When they brought together three
teams of computer programmers to translate a subset of the New York State
traffic law into computer code for the purpose of determining traffic violations
based on real-world driving data, they found wide variances in cited violations
and citation frequency depending on whether the group followed the letter of
the law, the intent of the law, or additional guidance and instructions from the
experiment’s designers.93
One solution that can help alleviate this type of translation-induced
problem is to conduct periodic audits—both internally and externally—to
determine whether the laws have been faithfully translated.94 Such audits reflect
the best practices advocated by the technology community. Principle 7 of the
ACM Statement on Algorithmic Transparency and Accountability declared,
“Institutions should use rigorous methods to validate their models and
document those methods and results.”95 The FAT/ML Principles for Accountable
89. See Lisa A. Shay et al., Confronting Automated Law Enforcement, in ROBOT LAW, supra note 16, at 257–
59 (discussing the legal integration of algorithms); Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, Autonomous Driving: Regulatory
Challenges Raised by Artificial Decision-Making and Tragic Choices, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 251,
262–64 (discussing the need to translate law into algorithm).
90. Perel & Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering, supra note 39, at 189; see also Shay et al., supra note 89, at
257 (“[T]hose who specify and implement the code base of a system will likely make their own interpretations
of legal and illegal behavior, perhaps without any legal training.”).
91. Burk & Cohen, supra note 25, at 55.
92. Lisa A. Shay et al., Do Robots Dream of Electric Laws? An Experiment in the Law as Algorithm, in ROBOT
LAW, supra note 16, at 274.
93. See id.
94. See sources cited supra note 79.
95. U.S. PUB. POL’Y COUNCIL, ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, STATEMENT ON ALGORITHMIC
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2017), [hereinafter ACM STATEMENT].
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Algorithms and a Social Impact Statement for Algorithms also called for impact
assessment “(at least) three times during the design and development process:
design stage, pre-launch, and post-launch.”96 As Lorna McGregor, Daragh
Murray, and Vivian Ng explained:
During the design and development stage, impact assessments should evaluate
how an algorithm is likely to work, ensure that it functions as intended and
identify any problematic processes or assumptions. This provides an
opportunity to modify the design of an algorithm at an early stage, to build
in . . . compliance—including monitoring mechanisms—from the outset, or
to halt development if . . . concerns cannot be addressed. Impact assessments
should also be conducted at the deployment stage, in order to monitor effects
during operation. . . . [T]his requires that, during design and development, the
focus should not only be on testing but steps should also be taken to build in
effective oversight and monitoring processes that will be able to identify and
respond to [problems] once the algorithm is deployed.97

To promote transparency, commentators have called for greater disclosure
of not only algorithms but also of training data and algorithmic outcomes. 98
While such disclosure will certainly help those who are technology savvy, it is
often insufficient, especially for those who have difficulty understanding the
computer code, training process, or selected data involved.99 When learning
algorithms are deployed, closely scrutinizing the initial algorithms alone is

96. Nicholas Diakopoulos et al., Principles for Accountable Algorithms and a Social Impact Statement for
Algorithms, FAT/ML, https://www.fatml.org/resources/principles-for-accountable-algorithms (last visited
Sept. 12, 2020). FAT/ML stands for “Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in Machine Learning.”
FAT/ML, https://fatml.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2020).
97. Lorna McGregor et al., International Human Rights Law as a Framework for Algorithmic Accountability, 68
INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 309, 330 (2019).
98. See O’NEIL, supra note 74, at 229 (“We have to learn to interrogate our data collection process, not
just our algorithms.”); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1024–25 (2017)
(“What we need instead is a transparency of inputs and results, which allows us to see that the algorithm is
generating discriminatory impact.”); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 641
(2017) (“[W]ithout full transparency—including source code, input data, and the full operating environment
of the software—even the disclosure of audit logs showing what a program did while it was running provides
no guarantee that the disclosed information actually reflects a computer system’s behavior.”).
99. See RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 72, at 19 (“Only the programmers are in a position to know
for sure what the algorithm does, and even they might not be clear about what’s going on. In some cases
there is no way to tell exactly why or how a decision by an algorithm is reached.” (quoting Doc Searls,
Director, Project VRM, Berkman Klein Center For Internet & Society, Harvard University)); Chander, supra
note 98, at 1040 (“[T]he algorithm may be too complicated for many others to understand, or even if it is
understandable, too demanding, timewise, to comprehend fully.”); Kroll et al., supra note 98, at 638 (“The
source code of computer systems is illegible to nonexperts. In fact, even experts often struggle to understand
what software code will do, as inspecting source code is a very limited way of predicting how a computer
program will behave.”); Guido Noto La Diega, Against the Dehumanisation of Decision-Making: Algorithmic
Decisions at the Crossroads of Intellectual Property, Data Protection, and Freedom of Information, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO.
TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 3, 23 (2018) (suggesting that “a technical document which includes the algorithm
used and the mere explanation of the logic in mathematical terms will not in itself meet the legal requirement
[for the right to explanation]” and that this requirement “should be interpreted as the disclosure of the
algorithm with an explanation in non-technical terms of the rationale of the decision and criteria relied
upon”).
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unlikely to reveal the full extent of any problems that the automated fair use
systems may encounter.100 As Kartik Hosanagar and Vivian Jair observed:
[M]achine learning algorithms—and deep learning algorithms in particular—
are usually built on just a few hundred lines of code. The algorithm[’]s logic is
mostly learned from training data and is rarely reflected in its source code.
Which is to say, some of today’s best-performing algorithms are often the
most opaque.101

Given these disclosure-related challenges, commentators have called for
the development of explainable artificial intelligence to help document the
algorithmic analysis and the training process and to enhance human
understanding of the algorithmic operation.102 As Pauline Kim explained:
When a model is interpretable, debate may ensue over whether its use is
justified, but it is at least possible to have a conversation about whether relying
on the behaviors or attributes that drive the outcomes is normatively
100. As Yu and Spina Alì observed:
Deep learning machines can self-reprogram to the point that even their programmers are unable
to understand the internal logic behind AI decisions. In this context, it is difficult to detect hidden
biases and to ascertain whether they are caused by a fault in the computer algorithm or by flawed
datasets.
Yu & Spina Alì, supra note 76, at 5; see also Chander, supra note 98, at 1040 (“[I]n the era of self-enhancing
algorithms, the algorithm’s human designers may not fully understand their own creation: even Google
engineers may no longer understand what some of their algorithms do.”). Likewise, Joshua Kroll and his
collaborators explained:
Machine learning . . . is particularly ill-suited to source code analysis because it involves situations
where the decisional rule itself emerges automatically from the specific data under analysis,
sometimes in ways that no human can explain. In this case, source code alone teaches a reviewer
very little, since the code only exposes the machine learning method used and not the data-driven
decision rule.
Kroll et al., supra note 98, at 638 (footnote omitted).
101. Kartik Hosanagar & Vivian Jair, We Need Transparency in Algorithms, but Too Much Can Backfire,
HARV. BUS. REV. (July 23, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/we-need-transparency-in-algorithms-but-toomuch-can-backfire; see also Daniel Gervais, Exploring the Interfaces Between Big Data and Intellectual Property Law,
10 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 3, 5 (2019) (“[A]ny human contribution to the output of
deep learning systems is ‘second degree’.”).
102. See ACM STATEMENT, supra note 95, Principle 4 (“Systems and institutions that use algorithmic
decision-making are encouraged to produce explanations regarding both the procedures followed by the
algorithm and the specific decisions that are made.”); INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, supra note 80, at 68
(recommending software engineers to “document all of their systems and related data flows, their
performance, limitations, and risks,” with emphases on “auditability, accessibility, meaningfulness, and
readability”); Diakopoulous et al., supra note 96 (“Ensure that algorithmic decisions as well as any data driving
those decisions can be explained to end-users and other stakeholders in non-technical terms.”). As Yu and
Spina Alì recounted:
[A] team at Microsoft is trying to teach AI to show how it weighted every single variable in
evaluating mortality risk factors. Similarly, a team at Rutgers University is working on a deep
neural network that provides users with examples that demonstrates why it took a specific
algorithmic decision. Another project at the University of Berkeley involves lashing two neural
networks together, tasking one to describe the inner procedures running inside the other. Finally,
an international team consisting, among the others, of researchers from Facebook, Berkeley and
the University of Amsterdam has taught an image recognition software to show the evidence he
relied upon to reach its decisions.
Yu & Spina Alì, supra note 76, at 7 (footnotes omitted).
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acceptable. When a model is not interpretable, however, it is not even possible
to have the conversation.103

B. Approximation
The second pathway for automating the fair use standard is approximation.
It differs from the translation pathway in that its primary goal is not to convert
legal mandates or analytical approaches into computer code and algorithms, but
to approximate those decisions that have already been made, or are to be made,
by humans—whether in a courtroom, as part of law enforcement, or through
ordinary day-to-day practice.104 Because of the primary focus on end results and
their correlation to human decisions, algorithm designers are free to come up
with methods or strategies to facilitate legal automation, including those that
judges, lawyers, law enforcement personnel, and other human decisionmakers
have not traditionally used. The additional freedom in this pathway will also
allow algorithm designers to take full advantage of the technological potential
provided by deep learning, neural networks, and other advances in artificial
intelligence.105
For illustrative purposes, consider the different methods used to determine
fair use in these two pathways. In the translation pathway, computers will be
trained, most likely under the supervision of computer programmers, 106 to
conduct fair use analysis based on the factors stipulated in Section 107 of the
103. Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 922–23 (2017).
104. See Burk & Cohen, supra note 25, at 57–58 (“Judicial determinations and negotiated minimum
standards are not the only possible measures of current fair use practice; arguably, the more accurate measure
of fair use is the daily behavior of ordinary users.”). See generally ASS’N OF INDEP. VIDEO & FILMMAKERS ET
AL., DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005),
http://archive.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/fair_use_final.pdf (stating the best practices in fair use for
documentary filmmakers).
105. As a government report on artificial intelligence explained:
Deep learning uses structures loosely inspired by the human brain, consisting of a set of units (or
“neurons”). Each unit combines a set of input values to produce an output value, which in turn
is passed on to other neurons downstream. For example, in an image recognition application, a
first layer of units might combine the raw data of the image to recognize simple patterns in the
image; a second layer of units might combine the results of the first layer to recognize
patterns-of-patterns; a third layer might combine the results of the second layer; and so on.
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 1, at 9. For discussions of deep learning, see generally ETHEM
ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING: THE NEW AI 104–09 (2016); JOHN D. KELLEHER, DEEP LEARNING
(2019); JOHN D. KELLEHER & BRENDAN TIERNEY, DATA S CIENCE 121–36 (2018); THIERRY POIBEAU,
MACHINE TRANSLATION 181–95 (2017).
106. Machine learning generally can be separated into supervised and unsupervised learning, with the
latter having no predefined output. See generally ALPAYDIN, supra note 105, at 38–42, 111–18 (discussing
supervised and unsupervised learning); KELLEHER, supra note 105, at 26–30 (discussing supervised,
unsupervised, and reinforcement learning). Supervision, in this case, will be to set parameters for the
algorithmic operation or to add predefined outputs to constrain that operation. Although unsupervised
learning has become increasingly attractive due to its unlimited potential, most artificial intelligence systems
combine supervised and unsupervised learning techniques. See generally David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with
the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653 (2017) (providing
an accessible overview of machine learning for lawyers).
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Copyright Act.107 The way these automated systems undertake individual
factor-based analyses will likely mirror those taken by human decisionmakers.
While these systems may end up generating different decisions, human
experience largely informs the analytical processes that have been coded into
the systems. In fact, past human decisions, including but not limited to those
handed down by courts, will be used to train the automated systems to make
future decisions.
By contrast, the approximation pathway allows algorithm designers—and,
in the deep learning world, also artificial intelligence systems themselves—to
freely determine the methods used to approximate decisions made by judges,
lawyers, law enforcement personnel, and other human decisionmakers. As these
methods and strategies are deployed, adjustments will be continuously made,
utilizing new training data while relying on some or all algorithmic outputs as
feedback data. As Professor Burk described:
One can imagine that a neural network or other machine learning system
could detect these or other patterns in the data surrounding past cases,
matching them to similar patterns in the data surrounding future fair use
incidents, situations, and scenarios without formal programming definition of
the fair use factors.108

Professor Elkin-Koren noted the scenario in which “AI and machine learning
would make it difficult for courts to check the rules embedded in the system,
since these systems may not explicitly demonstrate the legal specifications of
the four factors of fair use.”109
In short, if automated systems are able to come up with decisions that have
a strong correlation to human decisions—for example, with a ninety percent
match (or whatever percentage society prefers)—that process may be deemed
satisfactory even if it relies mostly on pattern recognition, as opposed to
automated legal analyses based on the four statutorily stipulated fair use
factors.110 After all, the primary focus of the approximation pathway is not on
whether the automated systems have faithfully translated legal principles and
techniques, but whether the decisions generated by those systems approximate
human decisions.
One could certainly debate whether such approximation could provide an
acceptable pathway for legal automation.111 After all, thinking like a lawyer is

107. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
108. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 293.
109. Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1099.
110. Cf. Volokh, supra note 8, at 1192 (“We should focus on the quality of the proposed AI judge’s
product, not on the process that yields that product.”).
111. See Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 347 (“While one could argue that a proper fair use analysis must
be conducted the same way as how judges would, one cannot help but wonder whether society would find it
acceptable to have automated fair use determinations that generate outcomes that have high correlations to
the outcomes of judge-made decisions.”).
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what law schools try to instill in future members of the legal profession. 112
Nevertheless, the benefit of this alternative pathway can be quite significant,
especially considering the growing evidence that intelligent machines can
perform quite well when left to their own devices.113 To be sure, human
decisionmakers remain superior in making judgment calls,114 especially with
respect to circumstances that have not arisen before. 115 However, there is
sufficient evidence to show that intelligent machines can compensate for these
shortcomings by performing well on matters involving variables or hidden
relationships that human decisionmakers often overlook. Because humans can
make certain decisions better than machines, and vice versa, the best-case
scenario is when the legal system can take full advantage of the superior
performance of both types of decision-making.116
There are some significant drawbacks, however. Automated fair use
systems could consider factors that are highly problematic in democratic society
and that Congress and courts have treated as protected classes in the antidiscrimination context, 117 such as the race, color, religion, or sex of the author
or user. In their effort to approximate human decisions, these systems may also
introduce new factors that the statute and case law have not mentioned or
anticipated. While the creation of these new factors could spark helpful insights
and research—on factors that are more predictive of fair use outcomes,
perhaps—making decisions based on factors that courts do not use or
anticipate is inherently problematic from a rule-of-law standpoint.118
112. The literature on how to think like a lawyer is vast. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR
THINKING ABOUT THE LAW (2007); O LIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE PATH OF THE LAW (1897); KARL
N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1951); FREDERICK SCHAUER,
THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (2012).
113. See infra text accompanying notes 126–131.
114. As Rebecca Crootof observed:
[T]he judgment we value in a common law process is a distinctively human skill. Human judges
are sensitive to context, both to extenuating circumstances in individual cases and shifts in social
norms over time, and can flexibly apply legal rules. While human contextualization may be
incorporated during the design or training of an AI system, that is hardly the same as having
human contextualization at the time the algorithmic rule is applied, especially as that application
may occur in a temporally, geographically, and culturally different context. AI may be consistent,
but it is “brittle”: “[It lacks] the flexibility humans have to step outside their instructions and apply
‘common sense’ to adapt to novel situations.”
Crootof, supra note 8, at 238 (footnotes omitted).
115. See AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 59 (noting the weaknesses of machines in making
predictions “when there is too little data” and concerning “events that are not captured by past experience”);
Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, supra note 8, at 53 (“Many past efforts to rationalize and algorithmatize the law
have failed, for good reason: there is no way to fairly extrapolate the thought processes of some body of past
decisionmaking to all new scenarios.” (emphasis omitted)).
116. See sources cited infra note 150.
117. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting workplace discrimination based on “race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin”).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 165–167. In defense of automated fair use systems, the use of
the words “shall include” in Section 107 of the Copyright Act indicates that the statute provides a
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C. Self-Determination
The final pathway for automating the fair use standard is
self-determination—that is, the automated systems will make autonomous
decisions. While the starting point for the translation and approximation
pathways is, respectively, to imitate methods or strategies used by humans or to
approximate decisions they have already made, the self-determination pathway
places emphasis on independent decision-making.
In this pathway, automated systems will make decisions that, in their views,
will best promote creativity and serve the goals designated by computer
programmers—in this case, the goals of copyright. They will make fair use
determinations based on what they believe will fulfill those designated goals, as
opposed to the goal of faithfully translating legal norms into computer code
and algorithms or the goal of approximating human decisions.
Providing automated systems with wide autonomy will allow them to
generate new fair use decisions that differ significantly from those that have
already been, or are to be, handed down by courts. While such a pathway would
be highly problematic from a stare decisis standpoint, especially in a common
law jurisdiction like the United States, that pathway could help generate new
solutions that may initially sound counterintuitive to human decisionmakers but
that can in the end be proven to better promote creativity. If the goal of these
automated systems is to improve the creative environment that copyright law
supports, the latter can be as appealing as, if not more appealing than, the
former.
Indeed, outside the area of fair use and intellectual property law,
commentators have already documented how computers and artificial
intelligence can generate seemingly counterintuitive decisions that are ultimately
superior to human decisions.119 Even more complicated, human
decisionmakers, due to their own cognitive barriers, may not always be able to
fully appreciate the merits of these seemingly counterintuitive decisions. As
Professors Casey and Niblett reminded us:
Algorithms will often identify counterintuitive connections that may appear
erroneous to humans even when accurate. Humans should be careful in those
cases not to undo the very value that was added by the algorithm’s ability to
recognize these connections. This is especially true when the benefit of the
algorithm was that it reduced human bias and behavioral errors.120

non-exhaustive list of factors for courts to consider when making fair use determinations. See supra text
accompanying note 24. Thus, when the automated systems introduce new factors that the statute and case
law have not mentioned, these factors will not precipitate a direct conflict with the fair use provision.
119. See Millar & Kerr, supra note 16, at 120–22 (discussing the time when expert robots get better
decisions than humans). See generally id. at 117–24 (discussing human–robot disagreement).
120. Casey & Niblett, A Framework, supra note 82, at 354; see also RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 72,
at 40 (“People often confuse a biased algorithm for an algorithm that doesn’t confirm their biases. If
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Compared with the translation and approximation pathways, the
self-determination pathway will minimize these situations by ensuring that the
automated systems will not immediately discard those machine-made decisions
that do not correspond well to preexisting human decisions. Nevertheless,
because this pathway may generate decisions that differ significantly from those
preexisting decisions, a society that chooses the self-determination pathway
should put in place mechanisms to address potential conflicts between human
and machine-made decisions.121
D. Summary
Even though this Part has focused on three distinct pathways for legal
automation, it is important to keep in mind that hybrid routes can be developed
to incorporate more than one pathway. Indeed, the choice over the best mix of
pathways will lead algorithm designers to ask some key questions concerning
how best to automate legal standards and how to address the law–machine
interface. The next Part will discuss these design questions in greater detail.
As time passes, and as artificial intelligence technologies continue to
improve, new pathways may also emerge while some existing ones may become
obsolete. Should we reach the technological state at which machine-made
decisions are always preferable to human decisions—a scenario that would
admittedly be very far away122—the starting point for making legal decisions
may be intelligent machines, not human decisionmakers. If so, the translation
and approximation pathways would seem somewhat misguided, as they
privilege human decisions over machine-made decisions. Those two pathways
would also become increasingly impractical. After all, machines, not humans,
would make the majority of decisions, and there might not be enough human
decisions for machines to translate from or approximate.
III. LAW–MACHINE INTERFACE
The previous Part has identified three distinct pathways for legal
automation that can help enlist algorithms and artificial intelligence to

Facebook shows more liberal stories than conservative, that doesn’t mean something is wrong. It could be a
reflection of their user base, or of their media sources, or just random chance.” (quoting an anonymous
principal consultant of a consulting firm)); Harry Surden & Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity,
Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars, 38 C ARDOZO L. REV. 121, 158 (2016) (“[I]t is not uncommon for pilots in
the cockpit to be surprised or confused by an automated activity undertaken by an autopilot system.”). See
generally Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV.
1085 (2018) (documenting the limitations of intuition while noting the need to address inscrutability).
121. See discussion infra Part III.B, III.C.
122. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 8, at 2004 (“[F]or the foreseeable future, software systems that aim to
replace systems of social ordering will succeed best as human-machine hybrids, mixing scale and efficacy with
human adjudication for hard cases.”).
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modernize the legal system. This Part turns to a key issue that most
commentators have overlooked: the law–machine interface. To illustrate the
different questions on algorithmic design that will emerge in relation to this
interface, this Part focuses on three distinct issues: (1) the allocation of
decision-making power; (2) the hierarchy of decisions; and (3) the legal effects
of machine-made decisions. The more algorithm designers think through
questions involving these issues, the more success they will likely have in
charting an effective path toward legal automation.
A. Allocation of Decision-Making Power
When machine-made decisions are inferior to human decisions, it is logical
that technology will be used only, or mostly, to assist humans in making
decisions. By default, decision-making power resides in humans. However, as
artificial intelligence technologies continue to improve and as intelligent
machines become capable of making better decisions—at least in select
areas123—questions will arise over the allocation of decision-making power.124
Should machines at least make some decisions?125 If so, what are those
decisions? Should those machine-made decisions receive deference in the legal
system?
With growing evidence on the machines’ ability to outperform humans in
select areas, answering these questions has become increasingly challenging. For
instance, researchers have documented the advantage of using learning
algorithms to diagnose cancer and to perform other tasks in the health area.126
123. See Millar & Kerr, supra note 16, at 117 (“Once there are expert robots, it will be easier to argue in
some instances that they ought to be used to their full potential, because the evidence will suggest that in those
instances they will, on average, deliver better results than human experts.”).
124. For example, Tim Wu asked: “Just when and why are decisions brought to human attention, and
who decides when a human should decide?” Wu, supra note 8, at 2027. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and
Thomas Ramge asked a similar question: “Which decisions should we reserve for ourselves and which should
we delegate?” VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & THOMAS RAMGE, REINVENTING CAPITALISM IN THE
AGE OF BIG DATA 219 (2018).
125. As Mayer-Schönberger and Ramge observed:
If data-driven adaptive systems will offer us better answers to questions such as which school we
should send our kids to or which hospital an ambulance should take us to in case of an emergency,
then should we delegate that decision to the machines or retain it as the exclusive province of
human responsibility? What are we aiming for in decisions, anyway—getting the correct answer
or the one that makes us happy (after all, we, not the machines, must live with the consequences)?
Until now we rarely faced such choices, but in the future we routinely will. Developing a good,
solid sense of how to choose is a core competency we’ll have to develop and maintain.
This ability to choose what to choose is fundamentally empowering to humans. It preserves our
chance to contribute to the fate of the universe and may ensure us an enduring seat at the table
of evolution.
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & RAMGE, supra note 124, at 219–20.
126. See ERIC J. TOPOL, DEEP MEDICINE: HOW ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CAN MAKE
HEALTHCARE HUMAN AGAIN 117–18 (2019) (discussing the impressive progress in algorithmic image
processing); Jonathan Guo & Li Bin, The Application of Medical Artiﬁcial Intelligence Technology in Rural Areas of
Developing Countries, 2 HEALTH EQUITY 174, 175 (2018) (noting research showing that systems using deep

8CE27804-BB25-428A-BE50-16224798167C.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/5/2020 9:21 PM

216

[Vol. 72:1:187

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW

Commentators have also noted that algorithms “are better and faster than
humans at detecting credit card fraud,”127 not to mention that “[m]achines can
pool their resources in ways that humans cannot.” 128 In addition, the
performance of intelligent machines will not be affected by emotion,
exhaustion, stress, or other cognitive barriers.129 These machines “can [also] be
tested and [therefore] improved.”130 Should errors be found and corrected, the
machines “are unlikely to make the same mistake[s] again.”131
Given such superior performance, one cannot help but wonder whether
machines, as opposed to humans, should make more decisions. In several
narrow areas that require instantaneous responses, such as those involving the
application of emergency brakes in automobiles, we have already given
machines significant power to make those decisions.132
For illustrative purposes, consider the automated analysis of the four
statutorily stipulated fair use factors. While an automated system may find it
challenging to analyze the first factor concerning “the purpose and character of

convolutional neural networks are “able to classify skin cancer at a comparable level to dermatologists” and
“could improve the speed, accuracy, and consistency of diagnosis [of breast cancer metastasis in lymph
nodes], as well as reduce the false negative rate to a quarter of the rate experienced by human pathologists”).
127. Digital Decisions, supra note 76.
128. RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND BIOLOGY 261
(2005) [hereinafter KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR].
129. See Karni Chagal-Feferkorn, The Reasonable Algorithm, 2018 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 111, 144
(“Unlike humans, algorithms do not have self-interests affecting their judgement, they do not omit any of the
decision-making stages or base their decisions on heuristics or biases, and they are not subject to human
physical or emotional limitations such as exhaustion, stress or emotionality.” (footnotes omitted)); Crootof,
supra note 8, at 236 (noting that a “judge’s sensitivity to context and penchant for leniency may vary
dramatically with whether they are hungry, tired, bored, overworked, overwhelmed, or otherwise distracted”);
Daryl Lim, AI & IP: Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change, 52 AKRON L. REV. 813, 834 (2018)
(“AI does not suffer from perceptual limitations the way that humans do.”); Ozkan Eren & Naci Mocan,
Emotional Judges and Unlucky Juveniles (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22,611, 2016),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w22611.pdf (documenting the surprising impact of unexpected outcomes of
football games on the type and length of sentences handed down by juvenile court judges); Kurt Kleiner,
Lunchtime Leniency: Judges’ Rulings Are Harsher When They Are Hungrier, SCI. AM. (Sept. 1, 2011),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/lunchtime-leniency (“Judges granted 65 percent of requests
they heard at the beginning of the day’s session and almost none at the end. Right after a snack break,
approvals jumped back to 65 percent again.” (citing a study at Ben Gurion University in Israel and Columbia
University examining more than 1,000 decisions by eight Israeli judges who ruled on convicts’ parole
requests)).
130. MCAFEE & BRYNJOLFSSON, supra note 69, at 53.
131. Id. As the authors observed, “[I]t is a lot harder to get humans to acknowledge their biases (how
many avowed racists or sexists do you know?), let alone do the hard work required to overcome them.” Id.
132. See AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 112 (“Carmakers in the United States have reached an
agreement with the Department of Transportation to make automatic emergency braking standard on
vehicles by 2022.”); Millar & Kerr, supra note 16, at 118 (“[C]ases that are time-sensitive—critical emergency
room admissions, perhaps, or cases where [Google driverless cars] need to make split-second decisions about
how best to navigate rapidly evolving traffic situations—might afford human experts the time to disagree
with the robot, but little or no time to evaluate the underlying rationales to come to anything resembling a
meaningful conclusion about the sources of disagreement.”).
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the use”133 of the copyrighted work,134 it may find the analysis of other factors
easier. A case in point is the analysis of the third factor, which focuses on “the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole.”135 When analyzing this factor, courts usually engage in both
quantitative and qualitative analyses.136 For computers, quantitative analyses are
the easiest.137 In fact, any judge wanting to make an efficient and effective
comparison will deploy computers to undertake some of the comparative tasks,
such as counting the number of words in the original work and the potentially
infringing work.138
By contrast, qualitative analyses seem to be much more challenging. After
all, how can an automated system know which part of the copyrighted work is
highly important, especially considering that computers and robots are
notorious for their lack of emotion and empathy?139 Indeed, determining what
133. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
134. See Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 292 (“[C]oncepts like ‘educational use’ or ‘news
reporting’ might be unexpectedly tricky to reduce to computable code. But one can, for example, imagine
programming a system to determine, perhaps on the basis of geolocational data and scraped calendaring or
advertising data, whether a nondramatic musical work is being performed at an agricultural fair.”); Felten,
supra note 46, at 58 (identifying the “[l]ack of knowledge about the circumstances” of the use as one of the
two key reasons why fair use cannot be built into digital rights management systems (emphasis omitted)).
However, Professor Elkin-Koren disagreed:
[One] concern [regarding the limitations of algorithmic fair use] is that algorithms that analyze
fair use will fail to process information that is external to the content itself. For instance,
determining the nature of use may require external information and additional analysis of facts.
Yet, algorithms could be programmed to extract and analyze data from external sources. For
instance, educational use might be determined based on tagging the nature of the user. A program
could detect the type of user (e.g., educational institution, governmental agency) based on the
domain name (e.g., .edu, .gov) or by checking registration in external databases. Another
indication for the nature of use could be the type of tagging selected by the party that uploads the
work (educational, commercial, personal/private use). The commercial nature of use might
actually be determined by the presence of advertisements, or other means of monetizing the
content. External information might also be used to determine “the effect of the use upon the
potential market” for the copyrighted work, using the commercial nature of use as a proxy.
Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1095–96. Whether the automated system can extract and analyze data from
external sources, as Professor Elkin-Koren proposed, will depend largely on whether an enabling
environment exists to allow for such extraction and analysis. See Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 351–63
(underscoring the need to build this enabling environment).
135. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
136. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994) (“[The third] factor calls for
thought not only about the quantity of the materials used, but about their quality and importance, too.”);
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 583 n.6 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“The inquiry into the substantiality of appropriation has a quantitative and a qualitative aspect.”).
137. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1096 (“Some fair use considerations might be relatively easy to
automate, such as the amount copied from the original work. For instance, a program could give a higher fair
use score based on similarity of less than 10 percent.”).
138. See Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 344 (“[A]ny judge seeking to undertake a quick quantitative
analysis will likely rely on computer assistance to count words or compare sizes.”).
139. See LEE, supra note 4, at 142 (“Taking the next step to emotionally intelligent robots may require
self-awareness, humor, love, empathy, and appreciation for beauty. These are the key hurdles that separate
what AI does today—spotting correlations in data and making predictions—and artificial general
intelligence.”); MCAFEE & BRYNJOLFSSON, supra note 69, at 123 (“[T]he ability to work effectively with
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courts have referred to as the “heart” of the work140 will likely require the
professional judgment of human decisionmakers.141 Nevertheless, Amazon
now has a large trove of data concerning which pages or sentences of a book
Kindle users have highlighted.142 Netflix also has substantial, and at times
shocking, data about which part of a movie or a TV program its subscribers
have paused or viewed repeatedly.143 In fact, with the deployment of big data
analysis and the utilization of external market data, the automated system may
be able to generate some useful predictions on which part of the copyrighted
work will likely be popular or commercially successful. Even though these
indicators alone may not show what courts would consider as the heart of the
copyrighted work, the increased availability of these indicators does suggest the
machines’ growing ability to make automated fair use determinations.
Similar to the third-factor analysis, computers can also analyze quite well
the fourth factor, which concerns “the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”144 On its face, analyzing the actual
or potential market of a copyrighted work will require professional expertise.
As Professor Felten observed more than a decade ago, “[T]he fourth factor in
the [fair use] test . . . requires reasoning about the economics of a particular
market, a task even well-trained humans find difficult.”145 In reality, computers
and artificial intelligence have already been actively deployed to provide
predictive analyses in many areas that are far more complex, challenging, and
volatile than predicting the market of a copyrighted work.146 In the financial
industry, for example, it is increasingly common to find computers making
people’s emotional states and social drives will remain a deeply human skill for some time to come.”); TOPOL,
supra note 126, at 290 (“[H]uman empathy is not something machines can truly simulate, despite ongoing
efforts to design sociable robots or apps that promote empathy.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for
Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1269–71 (1992) (discussing the lack of capacity in artificial
intelligence for feelings).
140. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588–89 (discussing the use of “the ‘heart’ of the original” in the
parody context); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 600 (analyzing whether the defendant magazine “had taken ‘the
heart of the book’”).
141. See Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 292 (noting the difficulty in programming an
automated fair use system “to determine . . . whether an excerpt from the work is so significant as to
constitute the ‘heart’ of an author’s creation”).
142. See Viewing Popular Highlights on Kindles, EBOOK READER (Feb. 15, 2018), https://blog.the-ebookreader.com/2018/02/15/viewing-popular-highlights-on-kindles (“Popular Highlights show the most
highlighted passages that readers have added to Kindle books. . . . Amazon also displays how many times
each passage has been highlighted.”).
143. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Second Digital Disruption: Streaming and the Dawn
of Data-Driven Creativity, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1555, 1587 (2019) (“Some parameters that Netflix tracks include,
but are likely not limited to, pause/rewind/fast-forward behavior; day of the week; date of viewing; time of
viewing; zip code; preferred devices; completion rate; user ratings; user search behavior; and browsing and
scrolling behavior.”).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
145. Felten, supra note 46, at 58.
146. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1097 (“AI has already been applied for decision-making
processes in contexts that are far more complex than fair use, involving critical issues of life and death, health,
financial risks, and national security.”).
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predictions about stock values or prices.147 There is also a fast-growing literature
on the use of artificial intelligence in finance.148
In sum, society will continue to rely on humans to make certain decisions,
especially those involving judgment calls or those lacking in historical data.
Meanwhile, machines can be utilized to make other decisions. Even if those
machine-made decisions are not better than human decisions, the machines’
ability to provide decisions in real time, or close to real time, will make the
former highly appealing.149 For creative projects that do not involve substantial
investments, many users will likely find instantaneous fair use determinations
more useful than time-delayed decisions rendered by professional experts, as
long as there is no significant variation in quality.
Because humans and machines can make better decisions in different areas,
commentators have started to highlight the importance of enabling two types
of decisions to complement each other. 150 For instance, Lee Kai-fu provided “a
blueprint for human coexistence with AI.” 151 Frank Levy and Richard Murnane
discussed the importance of a “new division of labor” that aims to maximize
the comparative advantage of both humans and machines.152 Mary Gray and
147. See Chagal-Feferkorn, supra note 129, at 116 (“In finance, algorithms are used for assessing credit
risks and mortgage risks, pricing complex insurance products, stocks ranking, or in general, creating financial
forecasts.”).
148. The literature emergent in this area is vast and fast-growing. See generally Tom C.W. Lin, Artificial
Intelligence, Finance, and the Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 531 (2019) (discussing the risks and limitations of
financial artificial intelligence); William Magnuson, Artificial Financial Intelligence, 10 HARV. BUS . L. REV. 337
(2020) (discussing the dangers and real-world limitations of deploying artificial intelligence in finance); Dirk
A. Zetzsche et al., Artificial Intelligence in Finance: Putting the Human in the Loop (Univ. of Hong Kong Fac. of L.
Working Paper, Paper No. 2020/006, 2020) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3531711 (discussing the increasing
role of artificial intelligence in finance, with a focus on human responsibilities).
149. See Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 346 (“[Automated fair use systems] will be able to draw
conclusions more quickly than humans, and will thereby facilitate real-time market analysis that will be both
costly and time-consuming when conducted manually.”).
150. As Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans, and Avi Goldfarb observed in the context of cancer diagnostics:
The human and the machine are good at different aspects of prediction. The human pathologist
was usually right when saying there was cancer. It was unusual to have a situation in which the
human said there was cancer but was mistaken. In contrast, the AI was much more accurate when
saying the cancer wasn’t there. The human and the machine made different types of mistakes. By
recognizing these different abilities, combining human and machine prediction overcame these
weaknesses, so their combination dramatically reduced the error rate.
AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 65; see also Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 282 (“[H]uman and
AI judges might collaborate by operating in tandem at specified stages of the judicial process, either by
functioning with a human in-the-loop or by preserving an extra measure of human oversight and involvement
at particular points.”); Paul Scharre, Centaur Warfighting: The False Choice of Humans vs. Automation, 30 TEMP.
INT’L & COMPAR . L.J. 151, 151 (2016) (“[I]n many situations, human-machine teaming in engagement
decisions will not only be possible but preferable. Hybrid human-machine cognitive architectures will be able
to leverage the precision and reliability of automation without sacrificing the robustness and flexibility of
human intelligence.”); Wu, supra note 8, at 2005 (“[W]hen it comes to systems that replace the law, designers
should be thinking harder about how best to combine the strengths of humans and machines, by
understanding the human advantages of providing a sense of procedural fairness, explainability, and the
deciding of hard cases.”).
151. See LEE, supra note 4, at 197–225.
152. LEVY & MURNANE, supra note 17.
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Siddharth Suri documented the large pool of humans performing “ghost work”
that is indispensable to advances in the field of artificial intelligence.153 Sarah
Roberts provided an important ethnographic study of human commercial
content moderators, who work behind the scenes to screen and remove
content, enforce policies on online platforms, and improve the outcomes of
automated moderation.154 Thus, should humans and machines be making
decisions at the same time, it will be highly important to decide how to allocate
decision-making power between humans and machines. For those with
economic acumen, it will also be fruitful to find ways to maximize the optimality
of such allocation.
B. Hierarchy of Decisions
Once we have decided how to allocate decision-making power, the next
key design question concerns the hierarchy of decisions—or the establishment
of a set of decisional rules.155 For the foreseeable future, human decisions will
trump machine-made decisions in most, if not all, cases. However, as society
becomes more accustomed to artificial intelligence and more willing to trust
machine-made decisions, the latter will receive more deference—either in select
areas or be given more weight in the overall decisions. As a result, the hierarchy
of decisions may begin to shift away from a hegemony of human decisions.
Consider, for instance, the context of automated copyright enforcement,
which provides one of the most widely used examples of automated legal
systems.156 While machines have been used to identify potential infringing
153. See generally MARY L. GRAY & SIDDHARTH SURI, GHOST WORK: HOW TO STOP SILICON VALLEY
FROM BUILDING A NEW GLOBAL UNDERCLASS (2019). As they explained:
Beyond some basic decisions, today’s artificial intelligence can’t function without humans in the
loop. Whether it’s delivering a relevant newsfeed or carrying out a complicated texted -in pizza
order, when the artificial intelligence . . . trips up or can’t finish the job, thousands of businesses
call on people to quietly complete the project. This new digital assembly line aggregates the
collective input of distributed workers, ships pieces of projects rather than products, and operates
across a host of economic sectors at all times of the day and night.
Id. at ix–x. Falling within “ghost work” are such tedious tasks as content classification, image tagging, photo
comparison, video screening, and data cleaning. See id. at x–xxiii. The book further discussed the need for
human workers to develop datasets that are used for training artificial intelligence and how the new advances,
in turn, have generated new cycles that require even more human workers to complete intervening tasks.
They described these cycles as “the paradox of automation’s last mile”: “Humans trained an AI, only to have
the AI ultimately take over the task entirely. Researchers could then open up even harder problems. . . . These
problems needed yet more training data, generating another wave of ghost work.” Id. at 8.
154. See generally SARAH T. ROBERTS, BEHIND THE SCREEN: CONTENT MODERATION IN THE
SHADOWS OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2019). As she observed, “Issues of scale aside, the complex process of sorting
user-uploaded material into either the acceptable or the rejected pile is far beyond the capabilities of software
or algorithms alone.” Id. at 34.
155. This hierarchy of decisions immediately brings to mind Isaac Asimov’s Second Law of Robotics:
“A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the
First Law [which states that a robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being
to come to harm].” ISAAC ASIMOV, Runaround, in I, ROBOT 25, 37 (Del Rey, reprint ed. 2008).
156. See sources cited supra note 39.
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materials, human oversight has been built into the systems to ensure verification
before takedown requests are sent to online service providers or platforms.157
Indeed, when incorrect requests have been made, the copyright holder or its
supportive industry group often explains away the mistake by showing how the
human involved has failed to properly verify the alleged infringement. 158
In recent years, however, we have seen the growing use of robo notices,
automatic takedown notices that are being sent out by computers to online
service providers or platforms with no or insufficient human oversight. 159 Part
of the reason for the popularity of these robo notices is their ability to respond
to the unmanageable volume of copyrighted works that are now being
disseminated and the exceedingly large amount of potential infringement that
is being found on the Internet. 160 Another key reason is that economics favor
the use of such automated notices, especially when there is no penalty for
sending out incorrect notices.161 Indeed, commentators have lamented the
growing impact of a large volume of robo notices that has now been sent to
online service providers and platforms without human oversight.162 In short,

157. Cf. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“The DMCA
already requires copyright owners to make an initial review of the potentially infringing material prior to
sending a takedown notice; indeed, it would be impossible to meet any of the requirements of Section 512(c)
without doing so.”).
158. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, RIAA Apologizes for Threatening Letter, ZDNET (May 13, 2003, 11:42
GMT), https://www.zdnet.com/article/riaa-apologizes-for-threatening-letter (reporting the claim of the
Recording Industry Association of America that the failure of a temporary employee to follow its established
protocol was the reason behind a wrongful takedown notice sent to Penn State University that had almost
caused the departmental server to shut down during the final examination period).
159. See generally Joe Karaganis & Jennifer Urban, The Rise of the Robo Notice, COMM. ACM, Sept. 2015,
at 28 (expressing concern about the growing use of robo notices to remove potentially infringing copyrighted
materials).
160. Cf. id. at 28 (noting “the adoption of automated notice-sending systems by rights holder groups
responding to sophisticated infringing sites”); Perel & Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering, supra note 39, at 190–
91 (“[P]rivate, online intermediaries . . . often use robots to handle the immense traffic of online content.”);
Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 347–48 (“With the creation and dissemination of hundreds of exabytes of data
and digital content every day, it is almost impossible for technology platforms to not rely on algorithms to
determine whether a specific use of a copyrighted work has complied with copyright law.” (footnote
omitted)).
161. Although Section 512(f) of the Copyright Act penalizes those who “knowingly materially
misrepresent[]” information, 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), “copyright’s ambiguity assures that many statements of
infringement can be made in good faith, even though a court may find that no infringement actually exists.”
Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First
Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1888 n.278 (2000); see also Karaganis & Urban, supra note 159, at 30 (“Stronger
liability for reckless or malicious notice use might be a good step in curbing the worst notice practices, which
can include deceptive or predatory behavior. But such changes are currently a dead letter in U.S. copyright
politics.”).
162. See Perel & Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering, supra note 39, at 204 (“[R]ecent studies prove that
prominent [online service providers], facing a flood of robo-takedown notices sent automatically by
right-holders, substitute human review of the vast majority of these notices with their own privately designed
automated systems.”); Sag, Internet Safe Harbors, supra note 40, at 543 (“[I]n spite of the DMCA’s requirement
that takedown notices attest to the complaining party’s ‘good faith belief’ in infringement, massive volumes
of such notices are clearly sent, and often acted upon, without meaningful human review.” (footnote
omitted)).

8CE27804-BB25-428A-BE50-16224798167C.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/5/2020 9:21 PM

222

[Vol. 72:1:187

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW

the change in technological environment and social preferences has caused
society to give machine-made decisions more deference than they once had.
Similar changes can be found in the fair use context. Although fair use
decisions could be made with built-in human oversight, the large volumes of
online content that are being evaluated for fair use purposes will likely require
the development of automated systems. 163 If so, humans will have to provide
oversight after the fact.
One possibility for providing such oversight ex post is to allow
machine-made decisions to be challenged in a court of law.164 Upon such a
challenge, a judge will be able to intervene should the automated system reach
a wrong or undesirable decision. The allowance for judicial intervention
precipitates the need to think more deeply about the hierarchy of decisions—
Should judges always trump machines? From a rule-of-law or constitutional
standpoint, there are considerable benefits to reserving final decisions to human
judges.165 As Tim Wu reminded us, a key advantage of retaining the use of
human courts is procedural fairness.166 As he observed, “There
are . . . advantages to adjudication as a form of social ordering that are difficult
to replicate by any known means.”167
One caveat that is worth noting in this area concerns the challenge of
deciding when to undertake human intervention. Just because the automated
systems have made decisions that differ significantly from what human judges
would have rendered does not mean that those machine-made decisions are
wrong or undesirable.168 When these decisions are challenged before courts,
163. See AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 67 (“One major benefit of prediction machines is that they
can scale in a way that humans cannot.”); TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET:
PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 97
(2018) (“Artificial intelligence techniques offer . . . to solve the problem of scale.”); Wu, supra note 8, at 2002
(“Compared with the legal system, software has enormous advantages of scale and efficacy of enforcement.
It might tirelessly handle billions if not trillions of decisions in the time it takes a human court to decide a
single case.”); Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 347–49 (discussing the scalability of automated fair use systems).
164. See sources cited supra note 84.
165. See Michaels, supra note 8 (discussing the negative impact of automated adjudication on legal
change, separation of powers, and the rule of law); Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 262–78 (noting
the concerns that artificial intelligence-based adjudication will make the legal system more incomprehensible,
data-based, alienating, and disillusioning).
166. See Wu, supra note 8, at 2002 (“One set of advantages [of human courts] . . . is related to procedural
fairness.”); see also Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic
Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1554–57 (2019) (recapitulating the literature on algorithmic due
process); Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 284 (“The idea of mechanized verdicts, especially criminal
verdicts, . . . seems to cut at the heart of democratic self-government, as well as due process.”); Olivier
Sylvain, Recovering Tech’s Humanity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. F. 252, 261 (2019) (“Human review is essential today
because it confers a degree of legitimacy on the platforms’ moderation choices.”). See generally Tom R. Tyler,
Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV. 26 (2007) (discussing the importance of procedural justice).
167. Wu, supra note 8, at 2002.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 119–120. The converse is also true. Just because the automated
systems have made decisions that coincide with what human judges would have rendered does not mean that
those decisions are necessarily more correct or desirable. Cf. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The
Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 33 (2014) (“Scoring systems have a
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judges will have to use their own professional judgment to determine whether
to retain those seemingly incorrect or counterintuitive machine-made decisions.
Indeed, making such determinations will remain a key exercise of judicial
discretion.
Finally, should society decide to let machines make at least some
autonomous decisions, we can still have a hierarchy of decisions favoring
humans—for instance, by providing an opportunity to have an override.169 A
good example in this area concerns those algorithms that have been deployed
in cars to facilitate automatic lane correction. 170 When a car veers into another
lane, those built-in algorithms will quickly help the driver steer the car back to
its original lane. Should the driver disagree with the computer-made decision,
the human decisionmaker can hold on to the steering wheel or turn it in the
opposite direction to initiate an override. By providing this override, the
algorithms involved preserve a hierarchy of decisions that favors human
decisions. Such an arrangement contrasts significantly with the arrangement for
the automatic application of emergency brakes, in which machine-made
decisions will trump human decisions.
C. Legal Effects of Machine-Made Decisions
Once we have figured out the hierarchy of decisions, there remains the final
design question concerning what legal effects machine-made decisions will
have.171 For instance, in an environment in which humans can intervene by
making decisions that trump machine-made decisions, there will always be
questions concerning what legal effects machine-made decisions will have
should no human decisionmaker intervene.172 In an environment in which both
powerful allure—their simplicity gives the illusion of precision and reliability. But predictive algorithms can
be anything but accurate and fair.”); Ric Simmons, Big Data, Machine Judges, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal
Justice System, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1067, 1075 (2018) (“[P]redictive algorithms . . . create an illusory
‘technocratic framing’ of who is dangerous and who deserves greater punishment, even though the
algorithms’ conclusions are based on the same flawed data.”); Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in
Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 304, 375 (2018) (“Risk assessment tools wear the clothes of an evidence-based
practice—they are developed with the use of large data sets and sophistical techniques and endorsed by social
scientists running policy simulations—but risk assessments should not be considered evidence-based until
they have shown to be effective.”).
169. See Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 282 (“[H]uman and AI judges might collaborate by
operating in tandem at specified stages of the judicial process, either by functioning with a human in-the-loop
or by preserving an extra measure of human oversight and involvement at particular points.”).
170. See PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 1, at 18 (noting the “advanced cruise controls that
keep a car in its lane”).
171. Professor Hildebrandt defined legal effect as follows: “Legal effect denotes the consequences that
legal norms attach to specific actions or states; legal effect changes the legal status of a person or other entity
and attributes the ensuing rights and obligations to legal subjects.” HILDEBRANDT, supra note 10, at 168.
172. Cf. Mireille Hildebrandt, A Vision of Ambient Law, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL
FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 175, 177–80 (Roger Brownsword & Karen
Yeung eds., 2008) [hereinafter REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES] (discussing the distinction between
technological and legal normativity); Bert-Jaap Koops, Criteria for Normative Technology: The Acceptability of ‘Code
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humans and machines will make different legal decisions at the same time, or
in which human decisions do not always trump machine-made decisions, this
type of question will be raised even more frequently and will take on even
greater significance.
Consider once again the case study of fair use automation. Should a user
receive a machine-made fair use determination, would that determination have
any legal effect in the sense that it will protect the user from future legal liability?
This question will be important even if human judges can always intervene by
overturning machine-made decisions. After all, if the machine-made decision
has the force of law, and the user has in fact relied on that decision to
disseminate the allegedly infringing content, that user will not infringe on the
protected work until the court overturns the decision. If the machine-made
determination is recognized by multiple platforms, including platforms that are
available overseas, giving legal effects to machine-made decisions can help
facilitate content distribution across these platforms, both domestically and
globally.
By contrast, if the machine-made determination has no legal effect, the
infringement can be traced back to the time before the court makes its fair use
decision, even though a judge could reduce the damage award based on
evidence of good-faith reliance on the machine-made determination. To be
sure, users are unlikely to seek machine-made fair use determinations if they
know in advance that such determinations will have no legal effects. However,
because fair use determinations are often made at gateways when platform users
upload content for dissemination, these users will still have strong incentives to
seek those determinations or will have no choice but to go through with such
determinations. For example, YouTube users seek machine-made
determinations not because they rely on the legal effects of those
determinations, but because such determinations are part of the content
uploading process.173
Finally, in determining the legal effects of machine-made decisions, one
could take a middle approach by giving those decisions some deference while
retaining some legal liability.174 For instance, with respect to copyright
infringement, society could introduce laws to allow machine-made fair use
as Law’ in Light of Democratic and Constitutional Values, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES, supra, at 157, 161
(“The way in which a legal norm is translated and inscribed in technology is a separate activity that should be
assessed in its own right, because ‘law in the books’ is not and cannot be exactly the same as ‘law in
technology’.”); Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 297 (“Patterns detected by a machine evaluating
fair use-related data should not be confused with a legal institutional determination of fair use.”); ElkinKoren, supra note 43, at 1099 (“AI systems do not decide fair use, but simply generate a score that reflects
the probability of fair use.”).
173. See supra text accompanying note 40 (discussing YouTube’s Content ID system).
174. Cf. Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 19, 2012),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots (advancing in the
context of automated weapons the trichotomy of “Human-in-the-Loop,” “Human-on-the-Loop,” and
“Human-out-of-the-Loop”).
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determinations to absolve the user from the legal liability for compensation
beyond what he or she has received. However, those laws could state that such
determination will not prevent the user from being subject to an accounting of
profit. Such a middle approach will likely be important to noncommercial users,
as many of them will have limited economic resources and will actively rely on
low-cost, or no-cost, machine-made decisions to advance their creative
projects.175
IV. THE FUTURE
Commentators have widely discussed the impact of artificial intelligence on
the legal system. As Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee reminded us, the
change brought about by artificial intelligence will take effect “[g]radually and
then suddenly,”176 recalling Ernest Hemingway’s famous description of how
one goes bankrupt in The Sun Also Rises.177 Noting the large-scale ramifications
in what they have coined “the Second Machine Age,” Brynjolfsson and McAfee
observed:
Progress on some of the oldest and toughest challenges associated with
computers, robots, and other digital gear was gradual for a long time. Then in
the past few years it became sudden; digital gear started racing ahead,
accomplishing tasks it had always been lousy at and displaying skills it was not
supposed to acquire anytime soon.178

Likewise, Lee Kai-fu lamented that “time is one thing that the AI revolution is
not inclined to grant us.”179
In the past few decades, commentators have widely explored how artificial
intelligence will affect the legal field.180 In view of this burgeoning and
ever-growing literature, this Part does not intend to rehash prior research.
Instead, it focuses on the various lessons we can glean from the earlier
discussion of the interplay of artificial intelligence and the law. Although these
lessons were drawn from a close analysis of automated fair use systems, they
can be easily generalized to inform other bodies of law or the larger legal system.
Covering the legislature, the bench, the bar, and academe, this Part underscores

175. See supra text accompanying notes 67–68 (discussing the benefits of automated systems in
providing low-cost fair use determinations).
176. ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS ,
AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 20 (2014).
177. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE SUN ALSO RISES 109 (Hemingway Library ed., 2014) (1926).
178. BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 176, at 20.
179. LEE, supra note 4, at 152.
180. See sources cited supra note 8.
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our need to carefully analyze the potential impact of technological change on
not only the law but also legal institutions.181
A. Law
In Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law, Mireille Hildebrandt asked a highly
provocative question concerning whether advances in artificial intelligence will
spell the end of the law as we know it.182 As she observed:
If we do not learn how to uphold and extend the legality that protects
individual persons against arbitrary or unfair state interventions, the law will
lose its hold on our imagination. It may fold back into a tool to train, discipline
or influence people whose behaviours are measured and calculated to be
nudged into compliance, or, the law will be replaced by techno-regulation,
whether or not that is labelled as law.183

In the end, she concluded that whether the law as we know it will “end”
“depends on how we design, construct and develop our information and
communication infrastructures and how we engage with the mindless agents
that will ‘people’ our onlife world.”184 To ensure the significantly more desirable
outcome, she called on us to “build[] legal protection into our artefactual
environment, reinventing recalcitrance . . . as well as the means to generate
values and added value in a shared onlife world that celebrates and affords both
democracy and the Rule of Law.”185
While Professor Hildebrandt was right that the law will still have important
roles to play, the growing interplay of artificial intelligence and the law suggests
that the role of law will change in at least three distinct ways. First, given the
ever-growing algorithmic deployment to make legal decisions at the same time,
the line between human and machine-made decisions will increasingly blur.
While the law will initially leave most decisions to human decisionmakers, it is
only a matter of time before people become more comfortable with
machine-made decisions, especially on matters involving narrow or trivial areas.
Moreover, if technology has improved to a state where machine-made decisions
can closely approximate human decisions, it may be difficult to distinguish
between these two types of decisions. Their indistinguishability immediately
brings to mind the ongoing discussions in artificial intelligence literature relating

181. See COHEN, supra note 47, at 2 (underscoring the need to understand “how both
information-economy disputes and new informational capabilities are reshaping the enterprise of law at the
institutional level”).
182. HILDEBRANDT, supra note 10.
183. Id. at xiii.
184. Id.; see also LEE, supra note 4, at xi (“Our AI future will be created by us, and it will reflect the
choices we make and the actions we take.”).
185. HILDEBRANDT, supra note 10, at xiii.
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to passing the Turing test,186 machine superintelligence,187 and technological
singularity.188
Second, because intelligent machines will play increasingly important roles
in the legal process, and computer code and algorithms are not as territorially
tethered as the law, global and foreign norms will likely have a bigger impact on
local decision-making processes than what we currently have in our legal
system.189 Just like how laws that have been transplanted abroad bring values

186. Developed by Alan Turing, this test determines whether one can distinguish between the
intelligent behavior exhibited by a machine from that of a human. See A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and
Intelligence, 59 MIND 433 (1950) (advancing the Turing test). Interestingly, Turing believed that humans would
be able to create a machine that can pass his test at the end of the twentieth century. See id. at 442 (“I believe
that at the end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that
one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted.”). By contrast, Ray
Kurzweil set the date much later—at around 2029. See RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES
222 (1999); KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR, supra note 128, at 263.
187. See AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 222 (discussing superintelligence in machines). See generally
RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF INTELLIGENT MACHINES (1990) (providing an overview of intelligent
machines and exploring whether machines can be intelligent and what it means for them to be so).
188. As the Obama Administration observed in its white paper:
People have long speculated on the implications of computers becoming more intelligent than
humans. Some predict that a sufficiently intelligent AI could be tasked with developing even
better, more intelligent systems, and that these in turn could be used to create systems with yet
greater intelligence, and so on, leading in principle to an “intelligence explosion” or “singularity”
in which machines quickly race far ahead of humans in intelligence.
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 1, at 8; see also KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR, supra note
128, at 7 (defining “singularity” as “a future period during which the pace of technological change will be so
rapid, its impact so deep, that human life will be irreversibly transformed”). See generally MURRAY SHANAHAN ,
THE TECHNOLOGICAL SINGULARITY (2015) (providing an overview of technological singularity). But see
DOMINGOS, supra note 75, at 286–89 (challenging Kurzweil’s view on singularity). Benjamin Alarie extends
the concept of technological singularity to the legal field. See Benjamin Alarie, The Path of the Law: Towards
Legal Singularity, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 443 (2016). As he explained:
The legal singularity contemplates the elimination of legal uncertainty and the emergence of a
seamless legal order, which is universally accessible in real time. In the legal singularity, disputes
over the legal significance of agreed facts will be rare. There may be disputes over facts, but, once
found, the facts will map onto clear legal consequences. The law will be functionally complete.
Id. at 446.
189. See Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo, Preface to RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at xxiv,
xxv–xxvi (“Artificial intelligence will not be ‘content’ to stay within the geographical boundaries of any
particular jurisdiction, or nation state for that matter, therefore to be effective, the regulatory approach to AI
will have to be international in scope.”); BRAD SMITH & CAROL ANN BROWNE, TOOLS AND WEAPONS: THE
PROMISE AND THE PERIL OF THE DIGITAL AGE 300 (2019) (“[T]he inexorable course of technology is
forcing more international collaboration. . . . [I]ssues like surveillance reform, privacy protection, and
cybersecurity safeguards have all required governments to deal with each other in new ways.”).
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with them,190 technologies that are deployed overseas also export values.191
Langdon Winner rightly reminded us that technological artifacts embody the
political, social, economic, and other conditions behind the development of
these artifacts.192 Indeed, as technologies originating from developed and
emerging countries are being rapidly and widely deployed throughout the world,
one cannot help but wonder whether such deployment will lead to even greater
convergence of legal norms, beyond what we have already seen through
globalization and the efforts of international organizations and multilateral
agreements.193
Third, the increasing reliance on machine-based decision-making will have
a direct impact on the future development of the legal community. In fact,
commentators have already expressed concern that such reliance, and the
increased allocation of decision-making power to machines, will undermine the
effectiveness of that profession.194 As Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans, and Avi
Goldfarb observed in the artificial intelligence context, “If the machines get the
experience, then the humans might not.”195 Growing legal automation could
therefore lead to the deskilling of the legal profession,196 just like how our ability
190. As Alan Watson observed in his seminal work: “Transplanting frequently, perhaps always,
involves legal transformation. Even when the transplanted rule remains unchanged, its impact in a new social
setting may be different. The insertion of an alien rule into another complex system may cause it to operate
in a fresh way.” ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 116 (2d ed.
1993); see also Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 24 (1974) (noting
that, because transplanted laws often bring with them foreign values, they may upset longstanding traditions
in the recipient countries while at the same time undermining institutions that are “closely linked with the
structure and organisation of political and social power in their own environment”); Yu, Digital Copyright
Reform, supra note 31, at 770 (“[If legal transplants] are hastily adopted without careful evaluation and
adaptation, they may be both ineffective and insensitive to local conditions. They may also stifle local
development while upsetting the existing local tradition.”).
191. See LEE, supra note 4, at 18 (noting that “American technology companies . . . were pushing their
products and their values on users around the globe”); ERIC SCHMIDT & JARED COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL
AGE: TRANSFORMING NATIONS, BUSINESSES, AND OUR LIVES 111–12 (2013) (“Technology companies
export their values along with their products . . . .”).
192. See LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF
HIGH TECHNOLOGY 19–39 (1986) (noting that technological artifacts can embody specific forms of power
and authority); see also John Naughton, Here Is the News—but Only if Facebook Thinks You Need to Know,
GUARDIAN (May 15, 2016, 4:00 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/may/15/
facebook-instant-articles-news-publishers-feeding-the-beast (“Any algorithm that has to make choices has
criteria that are specified by its designers. And those criteria are expressions of human values. Engineers may
think they are ‘neutral’, but long experience has shown us they are babes in the woods of politics, economics
and ideology.”).
193. See generally Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 429–35 (2004) (discussing the international harmonization of intellectual property
standards).
194. See Michaels, supra note 8, at 1096–98 (discussing how the switch from human judges to robot
judges would weaken the legal community); Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 247 (“Increasing use of
AI will . . . foster lay and even professional alienation from law as adjudication increasingly moves within the
exclusive dominion of technical specialists.”).
195. AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 192; see also id. at 193 (“[E]xperience is a scarce resource, some
of which you need to allocate to humans to avoid deskilling.”).
196. See id. at 192 (noting the concern that “automation could result in the deskilling of humans”).
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to use maps will greatly decrease with our increasing reliance on apps or
software utilizing the Global Positioning System.197 Moreover, the increased use
of artificial intelligence may reduce the participation of the existing legal
community. As Richard Re and Alicia Solow-Niederman observed, “As AI
adjudicators play a larger role in the legal system, human participation will
change and, in some respects, decrease. Those developments raise the prospect
of alienation, or the tendency for some or all people to cease participating in
the legal system and even lose interest in its operations.”198
B. Legislature
As far as the interaction between artificial intelligence and the legislative
process is concerned, commentators have explored three broad sets of
legislative roles that will help facilitate legal automation. First, the legislature will
determine what type of decision can be automated. Second, it will provide
assistance to ensure the successful automation of those decisions, including the
provision of funding support and the introduction of laws to limit the liability
for faulty machine-made decisions199 and to prevent security breaches and
malicious interferences.200 Third, the legislature will provide legal remedies,
including institutional mechanisms, to address problems that will arise from the
automation of these decisions.201 To fashion these remedies, both the
government and the legislature will have important roles to play.
One area that has received only limited attention concerns the legislature’s
role in determining what type of algorithms could be deemed suitable for
automating laws and legal decisions. In a recent article, Professor Elkin-Koren
suggested that courts should play some role in making this type of decision.202
As she observed, with the growing use of artificial intelligence and machine
learning, they may have to “determin[e] acceptable error rates when testing the
outcome of such a system compared to determination by the court.” 203
While I agree with her on the need for determining acceptable error rates,
the legislature’s greater fact-finding capacity and its ability to bring in
technologists for testimonies will likely make the branch superior for making
197. See Joseph Stromberg, Is GPS Ruining Our Ability to Navigate for Ourselves?, VOX (Sept. 2, 2015, 11:31
AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/9/2/9242049/gps-maps-navigation (exploring whether the use of the
Global Positioning System has undermined our navigation skills).
198. Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 275.
199. See infra note 240 (providing sources examining the legal liability raised by autonomous vehicles).
200. See Crootof, supra note 8, at 240 (“Unintended glitches and intended interference from malicious
actors create other potential sources of error.”); Volokh, supra note 8, at 1171–77 (discussing the potential
hacking of the artificial intelligence judge programs and the exploitation of unexpected glitches in those
programs).
201. See Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311 (2019) (discussing
the challenges in designing a remedies regime for robots).
202. Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1099.
203. Id.
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this type of determination. If the legislature chooses, it could also create a
certification process or an institutional mechanism to help determine what type
of algorithm could be deemed suitable for making those determinations. 204
The development of this process or mechanism is important for two
reasons. First, such development will be needed to address the likely existence
of a wide variety of algorithms that could make satisfactory automated fair use
determinations.205 Indeed, the diverging algorithms that are being developed
will likely involve different trade-offs, such as “more speed, less accuracy; more
autonomy, less control; more data, less privacy.”206 Allowing for the existence
of multiple algorithms will therefore help increase consumer choices while
promoting competition in algorithmic quality.207
Second, past experience has shown that for-profit entities are unlikely to
develop a satisfactory arrangement that is in the best interest of the public. As
Olivier Sylvain observed:
The ambition to foster “healthy” online engagement, while more than an
afterthought, is hardly the Big Tech companies’ main priority. These
companies are not (and do not see themselves as) chiefly in the business of
calibrating the right balance between human moderators and screening
algorithms. Rather, their aim is to hold and expand their dominion over
networked information flows.208

204. Cf. Susan Saab Fortney, Online Legal Document Providers and the Public Interest: Using a Certification
Approach to Balance Access to Justice and Public Protection, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 91, 117–22 (2019) (discussing the
benefits of using certification to enhance consumer protection and to promote competition in the market of
online providers of automated legal documentation); Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 358 (noting the need to
“set up a neutral and representative body that would supervise the development of fair use algorithms” and
a process for certifying algorithms “that are . . . capable of making high-quality decisions”).
205. See AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 5 (“There is often no single right answer to the question
of which is the best AI strategy or the best set of AI tools . . . .”).
206. Id.; see also PAUL R. DAUGHERTY & H. JAMES WILSON, HUMAN + MACHINE: REIMAGINING
WORK IN THE AGE OF AI 126 (2018) (“A deep-learning system . . . provides a high level of prediction
accuracy, but companies may have difficulty explaining how those results were derived. In contrast, a decision
tree may not lead to results with high prediction accuracy but will enable a significantly greater
explainability.”).
207. As I noted in a recent article:
Competition is imperative if society is to develop more efficient, more effective, and less biased
algorithms. Such competition is particularly needed when algorithmic choices are increasingly
difficult, or time consuming, to explain. Indeed, without competition, it would be hard to identify
problems within an algorithm or to determine whether that algorithm has provided the best
solution in light of the existing technological conditions and constraints.
Yu, Algorithmic Divide, supra note 69, at 382–83 (footnotes omitted); see also Peter K. Yu, Data Producer’s Right
and the Protection of Machine-Generated Data, 93 TUL. L. REV. 859, 927 (2019) (noting that competition law is “a
critical area relating to data governance”); Annie Lee, Note, Algorithmic Auditing and Competition Under the
CFAA: The Revocation Paradigm of Interpreting Access and Authorization, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1307, 1310
(2018) (“Online competitors . . . promote fair online practices by providing users with a choice between
competitive products . . . .”).
208. Sylvain, supra note 166, at 264; see also Kroll et al., supra note 98, at 682 (“A prejudiced
decisionmaker could skew the training data or pick proxies for protected classes with the intent of generating
discriminatory results.”).
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If the legislature goes the certification route, it will have to take its role
seriously, lest it allow justice to be privatized.209 To protect the public, Richard
Re and Alicia Solow-Niederman proposed to “remove profit-seeking actors
from the market for jurisprudential tools” while calling on the government to
“produce a ‘public option’ jurisprudential tool for key purposes, such as
criminal justice.”210 In earlier articles, I also noted the need to “set up a neutral
and representative body that would supervise the development of fair use
algorithms.”211 The creation of this neutral and representative body will be of
critical importance if we are to prevent industry lobbies and interest groups
from capturing the algorithm design process the same way they would capture
the legislative process.212
C. Bench
When artificial intelligence is mentioned alongside judges, an oft-raised
question concerns whether we are now ready for machine-generated decisions.
In a recent article, Eugene Volokh advanced a highly provocative thought
experiment concerning society’s readiness for robot judges.213 His thought
experiment went as follows: if an automated system can generate a set of
opinions as persuasive as those written by an average human judge in an
opinion-writing competition, and if that system can be adequately protected
from hacking or other vulnerabilities, that system should be deemed to be “an
adequate substitute for humans.”214

209. See generally Eldar Haber, Privatization of the Judiciary, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 115 (2016) (highlighting
the danger of privatization of the judiciary to democratic society).
210. Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 285.
211. Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 358; accord Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, supra note
43, at 68 (“[W]e need to develop a process that brings together copyright holders, technology developers,
consumer advocates, civil libertarians and other stakeholders.”); see also IAN BROWN & CHRISTOPHER T.
MARSDEN, REGULATING CODE: GOOD GOVERNANCE AND BETTER REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 177 (2013) (“[G]reater multistakeholder involvement will improve the quality of regulatory design,
including the technical understanding of code.”); COHEN, supra note 47, at 192 (“Mastering the processes by
which technical standards are developed . . . requires . . . new public accountability mechanisms.”); SMITH &
BROWNE, supra note 189, at 208 (“[A] global conversation about ethical principles for artificial intelligence
will require . . . seats at the table not only for technologists, governments, NGOs, and educators, but for
philosophers and representatives of the world’s many religions.”).
212. See sources cited supra note 58.
213. Volokh, supra note 8.
214. Id. at 1138–39. Specifically, Professor Volokh utilized what he described as the “Modified John
Henry Test,” which runs as follows:
The way to practically evaluate results is the Modified John Henry Test, a competition in which a
computer program is arrayed against, say, ten average performers in some field—medical
diagnosis, translation, or what have you. All the performers would then be asked to execute, say,
ten different tasks—for instance, the translation of ten different passages.
Sometimes this performance can be measured objectively. Often, it can’t be, so we would need
a panel of, say, ten human judges who are known to be experts in the subject—for example,
experienced doctors or fluent speakers of the two languages involved in a translation. Those
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The aspiration of having robot judges is nothing new. In fact, the literature
on the application of artificial intelligence to the law dates back to as early as
the 1970s.215 While the artificial intelligence we have today is very different from
what we had at that time—with the latter featuring mostly mainframes, much
more limited processing power, and no big data analytics216—many of the legal
and ethical questions have remained the same.
Thus far, commentators have widely debated over whether robots should
be allowed to take the role of judges.217 Even if one agrees with Professor
Volokh that robots can eventually succeed in judicial roles and is willing to
ignore the fact that our state of technology is still quite far away from that very
scenario, judges will still be in a good position to contribute to the better
development of the law–machine interface. First, judges can determine what
type of technology can be satisfactorily deployed to assist with the adjudication
process. As Part II.B has noted, machines can perform certain tasks better than
humans. Allowing machines to focus on those specific tasks will provide what
commentators have referred to as “intelligence augmentation.” 218 Such
augmentation will free the judges “to focus on more complex legal
questions,”219 although commentators continue to debate the desirability of
hybrid decision-making.220

judges should evaluate everyone’s performance without knowing which participant is a computer
and which is human.
If the computer performs at least as well as the average performer, then the computer passes
the Modified John Henry Test. We can call it “intelligent” enough in its field. Or, more to the
point, we can say that it is an adequate substitute for humans.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
215. For this literature, see generally Bruce G. Buchanan & Thomas E. Headrick, Some Speculation About
Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 23 STAN. L. REV. 40 (1970); Anthony D’Amato, Can/Should Computers
Replace Judges?, 11 GA. L. REV. 1277 (1977); L. Thorne McCarty, Reflections on Taxman: An Experiment in
Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 90 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1977). The literature cited here was collected in
Volokh, supra note 8, at 1137 n.3.
216. See John O. McGinnis, Accelerating AI, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 40, 42–45
(discussing the evolution of artificial intelligence in the past few decades).
217. On this debate, see generally Crootof, supra note 8; Michaels, supra note 8; Re & Solow-Niederman,
supra note 8; Volokh, supra note 8; Wu, supra note 8.
218. See Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, supra note 8, at 54 (calling on the legal profession to pursue “a
complementary vision of human-machine cooperation” and to focus more on intelligence augmentation);
Liza Vertinsky & Todd M. Rice, Thinking About Thinking Machines: Implications of Machine Inventors for Patent Law,
8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 574, 612 (2002) (“‘[I]ntelligence augmentation’ allows the effects of automatization
to creep up the skill chain, providing for the substitution of white collar jobs by machines and allowing people
with less formal training and education to perform more sophisticated tasks.”); Volokh, supra note 8, at 1147–
52 (discussing the “AI Associate” and “AI Staff Attorney” models); Albert H. Yoon, The Post-Modern Lawyer:
Technology and the Democratization of Legal Representation, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 456, 466 (2016) (“Intelligence
augmentation . . . reflects a symbiotic relationship between humans and technology. Humans continue to
perform the task at hand, but they do so interactively with technology in order to do it better.”).
219. Yoon, supra note 218, at 468.
220. While the combined use of human and machine-made decisions has become increasingly common
and can generate more desirable outcomes, such hybrid decision-making can also generate outcomes that are
less desirable than those made solely by either humans or machines. See sources cited supra note 13.
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Second, judges can determine how much of the decision-making power
should be given to machines,221 especially in so-called hard cases.222 Even if
society prefers to have lawmakers decide the proper allocation of
decision-making power between humans and machines, the legislature could
still leave some discretion to judges to fine-tune this allocation based on
professional experiences and specific circumstances. Because fair use cases
involve case-by-case balancing, judges will find it helpful to retain some ability
to fine-tune such allocation.
Third, judges will have additional opportunities to influence the
development of the law–machine interface. In addition to making individual
case-by-case adjustments, they could exert influence as part of an epistemic
community.223 Indeed, because many jurisdictions are now grappling with
questions on the interplay of artificial intelligence and the law, there is an urgent
need for an active cross-jurisdictional judicial dialogue. Such a dialogue will not
only help achieve consensus at the national, regional, or international level, but
will also enhance the judges’ ability to anticipate and address unforeseen
challenges in this area.
Finally, judges can share their views with legislators and technologists. With
respect to the former, they can weigh in on the key algorithmic design questions
discussed in Part III, such as the allocation of decision-making power, the
221. As Richard Re and Alicia Solow-Niederman suggested:
[One] form of human/machine division of labor would apportion discrete types of judicial
decision-making to human as opposed to mechanized actors. The resulting separation could be
based on subject matter, such as a rule barring automated judging in criminal cases. Or it could
derive from more fine-grained determinations about which parts of a legal decision raise concerns
about equitable and codified justice. For example, some types of fact-finding could be well-suited
for mechanization, without a commensurate cost in disillusionment and alienation, so long as
there is a human judge who engages in the analytically severable task of applying the facts to the
law. Even within appellate courts, a split in judicial function between human rule-generation and
mechanized rule-application might be desirable. More broadly, codified justice already marks key
aspects of many bureaucratic legal systems, and AI adjudicators might simply offer a better
version of codified justice, limited to those contexts.
Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 283 (footnotes omitted).
222. As Professor Wu observed:
[One] benefit of human courts over software is their advantages in hard cases, and the prevention
of absurd errors, obviously unjust results, and other inequitable consequences of a blind
adherence to rules. There are, on closer examination, several ways in which a case can be “hard.”
Some cases might be hard only because the software lacks the ability to understand context or
nuance, as in understanding that “I’m going to kill my husband” may be a figurative statement,
not a death threat. And, others may be hard in the jurisprudential sense because they require the
balancing of conflicting values or avoidance of absurd consequence. Finally, it may be that the
stakes just seem large enough to merit human involvement, as in the decision to sentence
someone to death.
Wu, supra note 8, at 2023.
223. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–103 (2004) (discussing the
interactions of judges in a transnational network); see also MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY:
GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 15 (1998) (noting that epistemic
communities “are valuable for their enormous pools of information and their capacities to acquire and
generate more”).
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hierarchy of decisions, and the legal effects of machine-made decisions.224 With
respect to the latter, judges can educate technologists on how they make
decisions and how to think like a lawyer.225 To the extent that we want to
preserve the existing judicial system and to avoid undue disruption by machines,
learning how judges make decisions will remain highly important. Such
knowledge will be even more important when society has chosen the translation
pathway over the other pathways to facilitate legal automation.
D. Bar
Similar to the question about judges, many commentators have questioned
our readiness for robot lawyers,226 including prosecutors, defenders, and
associates.227 Obviously, many questions still remain, ranging from the capacity
of intelligent machines to provide legal advice228 to their ability to effectively
handle ethical challenges.229 Instead of rehashing the answers to these
questions, this Subpart turns to a new area that has not received sufficient policy
and scholarly attention: the need for new legal personnel to play roles that did
not exist before the age of artificial intelligence.

224. See discussion supra Part III.
225. See sources cited supra note 112.
226. See sources cited supra note 8.
227. See generally Kristen Thomasen, Examining the Constitutionality of Robot-enhanced Interrogation, in ROBOT
LAW, supra note 16, at 306 (discussing how robot interrogators may engage the fundamental constitutional
rights to privacy and silence); Volokh, supra note 8, at 1147–52 (discussing artificial intelligence-driven
associates and staff attorneys).
228. As my colleague Milan Markovic aptly observed:
Regardless of their level of sophistication, clients often do not have clear objectives and require
assistance in shaping them. Clients also sometimes misunderstand the legal system and do not
view their situations, including any wrongs they may have suffered, in legalistic terms. A fully
autonomous, composed, and decided client may not require the counseling of an attorney, but
that is not the messy reality of the law as lived.
....
[Moreover, a]n intelligent machine may be able to determine if a course of conduct is unlawful;
it may also be able to calculate the probability that any misconduct will be detected. What it cannot
do is fulfill the other crucial “half” of a lawyer’s role: shaming and persuading clients and would-be
clients “that they are damned fools and should stop.” As David Luban has explained, intelligent
machines lack emotional intelligence and moral authority and cannot buttress legal and non-legal
considerations to exhort clients to act in accordance with the law.
Markovic, supra note 8, at 344–46 (footnotes omitted).
229. See Drew McDermott, Why Ethics Is a High Hurdle for AI 2 (Feb. 29, 2008),
http://www.cs.yale.edu/homes/dvm/papers/ethical-machine.pdf (“[E]thical behavior is an extremely
difficult area to automate, both because it requires ‘solving all of AI’ and because even that might not be
sufficient.”); see also DOMINGOS, supra note 75, at 280 (“[L]etting robots learn ethics by observing humans
may not be such a good idea. The robot is liable to get seriously confused when it sees that humans’ actions
often violate their ethical principles.”).
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In their widely cited book on big data, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and
Kenneth Cukier discussed the future need for algorithmists. 230 As they
explained:
These new professionals would be experts in the areas of computer science,
mathematics, and statistics; they would act as reviewers of big-data analyses
and predictions. Algorithmists would take a vow of impartiality and
confidentiality, much as accountants and certain other professionals do now.
They would evaluate the selection of data sources, the choice of analytical and
predictive tools, including algorithms and models, and the interpretation of
results. In the event of a dispute, they would have access to the algorithms,
statistical approaches, and datasets that produced a given decision. 231

Applying these insights to the present context, one cannot help but wonder
whether two new types of legal professionals will emerge: algorithmically
oriented lawyers and legal algorithmists.
Given the important and ever-growing roles of intelligent machines in the
legal process and the growing importance of addressing issues at the law–
machine interface, we will need to have lawyers that have a good grasp of
artificial intelligence and what the latest technology can and cannot do. 232 The
importance of algorithmic literacy233 has caused commentators and educators
to emphasize the importance of computational thinking.234 In the future, those
230. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT
WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 180–82 (2013) (discussing the need for external and
internal algorithmists).
231. Id. at 180.
232. See Crootof, supra note 8, at 244 (“If we wish to elicit the benefits of human reasoning, teaming
systems must be designed so that the human in the loop understands the AI program’s capabilities and
limitations, has reason to exercise valued human skills, and is actively engaged in the decisionmaking process.”
(footnote omitted)); Frank Pasquale, Data-Informed Duties in AI Development, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1939
(2019) (“[T]here is a parallel duty for technology providers to have some basic understanding of the law as
they serve their clients.”).
233. See INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, supra note 80, at 142 (“Improving digital literacy of citizens
should be a high priority for the government and other organizations.”); RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note
72, at 74–76 (surveying views on the need for algorithmic literacy); U.N. EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG.
[UNESCO], ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN EDUCATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 6–7 (2019) (stating that “teachers must learn new digital skills to use AI in a
pedagogical and meaningful way”); U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. [USAID], REFLECTING THE PAST,
SHAPING THE FUTURE: MAKING AI WORK FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 74 (2018)
(“Strengthening training programs for data science and machine learning in local development contexts can
help create a pipeline of individuals who are ‘bilingual’ in the sense of understanding local context and having
the technical skills to take an active role in developing [machine learning] tools.”); Yu, Algorithmic Divide, supra
note 69, at 362–65 (discussing the need to increase algorithmic literacy).
234. The International Society for Technology in Education and the Computer Science Teachers
Association provided the following operational definition of computational thinking:
Computational thinking (CT) is a problem-solving process that includes (but is not limited to) the
following characteristics:
• Formulating problems in a way that enables us to use a computer and other tools to help solve
them[]
• Logically organizing and analyzing data
• Representing data through abstractions such as models and simulations
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lawyers who are equipped with a better understanding of the technological
aspects of the legal decision-making process will likely be in better positions to
serve their clients than those who do not or who rely solely, or mostly, on
technology experts to provide gap-filling advice. The need for algorithmically
oriented lawyers therefore arises.
The flip side is also true. Just as society needs to have algorithmically
oriented lawyers, it also needs to have legal algorithmists. While internal
algorithmists conduct audits inside the developers of automated systems,235
external algorithmists undertake evaluation from the outside and fulfill roles
designated by the legislature or regulatory authorities.236 These algorithmists are
legal algorithmists because they have a specialized focus on legal technology
and on other technologies that have serious ramifications for the legal system.
E. Academe
As far as academic research is concerned, there is no shortage of materials
on artificial intelligence and the law.237 In fact, law schools and legal
• Automating solutions through algorithmic thinking (a series of ordered steps)
• Identifying, analyzing, and implementing possible solutions with the goal of achieving the most
efficient and effective combination of steps and resources
• Generalizing and transferring this problem solving process to a wide variety of problems
Int’l Soc’y for Tech. in Educ. & Comput. Sci. Teachers Ass’n, Operational Definition of Computational Thinking
for K–12 Education, INT’L S OC’Y TECH. EDUC., https://id.iste.org/docs/ct-documents/computationalthinking-operational-definition-flyer.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2019). See generally PETER J. DENNING & MATTI
TEDRE, COMPUTATIONAL THINKING (2019) (providing an overview of computational thinking).
235. As Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier observed:
Internal algorithmists work inside an organization to monitor its big-data activities. They look out
not just for the company’s interests but also for the interests of people who are affected by its
big-data analyses. They oversee big-data operations, and they’re the first point of contact for
anybody who feels harmed by their organization’s big-data predictions. They also vet big-data
analyses for integrity and accuracy before letting them go live. To perform the first of these two
roles, algorithmists must have a certain level of freedom and impartiality within the organization
they work for.
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 230, at 181–82.
236. As Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier elaborated:
We envision external algorithmists acting as impartial auditors to review the accuracy or validity
of big-data predictions whenever the government requires it, such as under court order or
regulation. They also can take on big-data companies as clients, performing audits for firms that
want expert support. And they may certify the soundness of big-data applications like anti-fraud
techniques or stock-trading systems. Finally, external algorithmists are prepared to consult with
government agencies on how best to use big data in the public sector.
Id. at 181.
237. In only a few years, a vast literature has quickly built up on the question of whether creative works
generated by intelligent machines are eligible for copyright protection. See generally Annemarie Bridy, Coding
Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5; Annemarie Bridy, The
Evolution of Authorship: Work Made by Code, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 395 (2016); Daniel J. Gervais, The Machine
as Author, 105 IOWA L. REV 2053 (2020); Jane C. Ginsburg & Luke Ali Budiardjo, Authors and Machines, 34
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 343 (2019); James Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work—
And It’s a Good Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403 (2016); Lim, supra note 129, at 836–47; Carys J. Craig
& Ian R. Kerr, The Death of the AI Author (Osgoode Hall Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 2019),
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commentators have been actively organizing symposia and book projects to
address questions arising at the intersection of artificial intelligence and the
law.238
While many questions have been explored in regard to whether artificial
intelligence will change the outcome of legal analysis—such as whether works
created by artificial intelligence are eligible for copyright or patent protection239
or whether accidents caused by autonomous vehicles deserve the same type of
legal liability240—it is time that academics explored whether some of these
questions will have to be asked differently.
In the example concerning the development of automated fair use systems,
the previous discussion has shown different pathways for legal automation:
translation, approximation, and self-determination.241 At the moment, we do
not have enough evidence—empirical or otherwise—to inform whether one
pathway will promote creativity better than the others. We also do not have
sufficient research concerning the law–machine interface or how to facilitate a
more optimal division of labor between humans and machines in the legal
system.242 Considering that the future of this system may be quite different from
what we have today, it may be wise to start anticipating these potentially
transformative changes and exploring what this process will become.
In addition to new thinking and research, academe needs to evaluate
existing curricula and pedagogies to determine whether they are equipped to
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3374951. For a provocative discussion of the role of robots in copyright’s
cosmology, see generally James Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 I OWA L. REV. 657 (2016). For
earlier discussions of copyright issues involving computer-generated works, see generally Ralph D. Clifford,
Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up, 71 TUL. L. REV.
1675 (1997); Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works:
Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1042–72 (1993); Pamela Samuelson, Allocating
Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185 (1986).
238. For symposia in the artificial intelligence area, see generally Symposium, Artificial Intelligence and the
Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Symposium, Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, and the Future of Law, 66 U.
TORONTO L.J. 423 (2016); Symposium, Common Law for the Age of AI, 119 C OLUM. L. REV. 1773 (2019);
Symposium, Rise of the Machines: Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law, 88 FORDHAM L.
REV. 381 (2019); 2019 Annual BCLT/BTLJ Symposium, BERKELEY CTR. FOR LAW & TECH.,
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/research/bclt/bcltevents/2019bcltbtlj-symposium (last visited Sept. 13,
2020); “Smart Law and Intelligent Machines” Symposium, TEX. A&M UNIV. SCH. OF LAW ,
http://law.tamu.edu/faculty-staff/news-events/conferences-and-symposia/smart-law-and-intelligentmachines-symposium (last visited Sept. 13, 2020). For book projects and law review articles, see sources cited
supra note 8.
239. See sources cited supra note 237.
240. For discussions of the legal liability raised by autonomous vehicles, see, for example, M ARK
CHINEN, LAW AND AUTONOMOUS MACHINES: THE CO-EVOLUTION OF L EGAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
TECHNOLOGY 52–101 (2019); HANNAH YEEFEN LIM, AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES AND THE LAW:
TECHNOLOGY, ALGORITHMS AND ETHICS 20–98 (2018); Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving and Product
Liability, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1; Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity-Driven Liability, 102 GEO. L.J. 1777 (2014);
David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117
(2014). See generally SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS
ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 119–51 (2011) (discussing tort liability for artificial agents).
241. See discussion supra Part II.
242. See discussion supra Part III.
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train the next generation of lawyers.243 As the previous Subpart has noted, the
need for algorithmically oriented lawyers will only continue to grow, and those
lawyers who have high algorithmic literacy will be in better positions to help
clients than those who do not.244 By introducing up-to-date curricula and
pedagogies, law schools and other legal education providers will be able to train
lawyers to take full advantage of the growing deployment of automated systems
and artificial intelligence technologies in the legal field while at the same time
responding effectively to the changes and challenges posed by these new
technologies.
CONCLUSION
The age of artificial intelligence has brought to the legal field many thorny
and complex questions. While some of them resemble questions that we are
already asking in the legal discipline, or are extensions of those questions, others
are novel and will require new legal, technological, or techno-legal insights.245
By utilizing the case study of fair use automation, this Article calls for greater
attention not only to the impact of artificial intelligence on the law but also to
the law–machine interface. If the impact of artificial intelligence in other areas
of society is any guide,246 the technological advances in this area will likely
precipitate profound changes to the legal system. The sooner we start thinking
about these changes, the quicker we can harness these technological advances
to improve the law, legal institutions, and the legal process, and the better off
society will be.

243. See sources cited supra notes 232–234.
244. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
245. See Peter K. Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 923, 939 (2008)
(“As [technological and legal protections] interact with each other, and improve over time, they result in a
technolegal combination that is often greater than the sum of its parts. It is therefore important to understand
not only law and technology, but also the interface between the two.”).
246. See generally BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 176 (examining the transformative impacts of
emerging digital technologies on jobs and the economy); CARL BENEDIKT FREY, THE TECHNOLOGY TRAP:
CAPITAL, LABOR, AND POWER IN THE AGE OF AUTOMATION (2019) (discussing the changing interplay of
capital, labor, and power in the age of automation).

